Part I. Introduction

The legal and arbitrary erasure of nationality is a form of violence against victims of statelessness.[1] Statelessness is not just a lack of citizenship—it is legal invisibility because people are excluded from protections such as due process and human rights.[2] Citizenship or nationality is the “right to have rights.”[3] Without it, individuals are stripped of legal personhood.[4]

Statelessness may be referred to as “hostis humanis generis,” which translates to the “enemy of humankind.”[5] Justice Earl Warren’s opinion in a plurality decision of the Supreme Court once said that, to strip someone of their nationality and leave them stateless “is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys . . . the political existence that was centuries in the development. . . . [H]e is stateless . . . . In short, [this person] has lost the right to have rights.”[6]

This Introduction elaborates on the dynamics surrounding the loss of birthright citizenship and how this loss can result in prolonged statelessness for those affected. Statelessness represents a multifaceted global issue that affects millions, yet it frequently goes unnoticed in mainstream discourse.[7] In terms of definitions, stateless persons are individuals who are not recognized as citizens by any nation, resulting in a lack of legal identity essential for accessing rights, protections, and civic participation.[8] This analysis aims to examine the causes, consequences, and challenges of statelessness, highlighting how legal systems, historical injustices, discrimination, and political marginalization contribute to its ongoing nature. Beyond its legal implications, statelessness constitutes a significant humanitarian crisis, stripping individuals of their dignity, opportunities, and sense of community. By examining statelessness through legal, social, and human rights perspectives, this paper underscores the pressing need for global awareness, policy reform, and inclusive solutions that affirm every individual’s right to nationality.

Furthermore, this Introduction also addresses various triggers of statelessness, particularly the erosion of birthright citizenship. It explores the present constitutional effects of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States (“U.S.”) Constitution regarding the deprivation of American birthright status.[9] Birthright citizenship—an automatic entitlement to nationality for those born within a nation’s borders—has been a fundamental component of inclusive nationhood and the safeguarding of human rights. It is not just a legal designation but also a firm assertion of belonging, identity, and equal participation in the community. Nevertheless, recent political changes, nationalist discourse, and restrictive legal reforms have jeopardized this essential principle. The loss or denial of birthright citizenship can result in individuals becoming stateless, stripping them of the legal acknowledgment essential for accessing fundamental rights and services. More significantly, it can disconnect individuals from their community and humanity, leading to feelings of profound alienation and exclusion. This Article examines the impact of weakening birthright citizenship on the global crisis of statelessness. It analyzes the profound psychological, legal, and societal consequences of denying individuals the fundamental right to belong.

It seems difficult and complicated to envision not being recognized as a citizen of the country in which one was born and has always lived.[10] Stateless individuals experience life as invisible, overlooked by the systems that establish identity, rights, and protections. For millions worldwide, being stateless means lacking citizenship, official recognition, and a nation to call home.[11]

Some people can freely move between countries because they have the necessary documents, such as visas or passports. However, others require documentation to prove their nationality and are therefore unable to migrate freely.[12] These people are stateless, meaning they do not legally belong to any country.[13] They require legal documentation on paper because a significant portion of what shapes a modern human is linked to nationality and citizenship.[14] When someone is deprived of these, a chasm forms between them and the broader human community.[15] Merely being alive does not demonstrate one’s existence; legal recognition in the form of documentation assigned by a sovereign state to an individual is essential for establishing nationality. The current global situation bears a resemblance to the inter-war period when nationalism was on the rise.[16] Nationalism seems to have become the most prevalent source of political conflict and violence today. It is politically correct that each nation should govern its affairs[17] free from external interference. However, originality or homogeneity of nationhood does not only occur when nations avoid external relationships or create hostility towards people of different nationhood or those who do not belong to any. Nationhood does not extinguish the dignity of foreigners who belong to a new political system. Rather than considering how external contacts might pollute or corrupt a nation’s purity, it should weigh the numerous benefits of diversity as positive impacts that foreigners could bring to the country.

Further, instead of being hostile to migrants, whether as refugees, internally displaced peoples (“IDPs”), stateless persons, or immigrants seeking to join new political communities, a nation could choose its purging system to determine which foreigners might be admitted or accorded nationality or not.[18] The critical value is for states to develop reasonable nationality laws and administrative principles that do not exacerbate the pain or hardship of statelessness or the risk of becoming stateless. A nation can uphold its values and identity while providing a welcoming community for those seeking a sense of belonging. This can be achieved through social connections rooted in shared culture, ethnicity, geographic location, language, politics, and normative beliefs, all within a diverse historical context.[19] While preserving its core values and identity, a nation can embrace individuals who align with its principles, including migrants, refugees, displaced persons, or stateless individuals, regardless of whether they have formal nationality or not.[20]

i. Historical Analysis of Statelessness

Historically, the post-imperial period and World War I witnessed considerable agitation among people fighting for recognition and an identity as legitimate nationals within a political system that did not acknowledge them.[21] Arguably, this identity crisis and the anxiety to “belong” have created numerous apatrides[22] people, with protracted effects of large-scale displacement. For example, having experienced protracted statelessness, Hannah Arendt once described stateless persons as follows: “[o]nce they had left their homeland they remained homeless, once they had left their state, they became stateless; once they had been deprived of their human rights they were rightless, the scum of the earth.”[23]

Arendt examines the origins of mass statelessness and its implications for the international order and security following World War I and II.[24] According to Arendt, World War I unsettled the basic concepts that defined the political reality of a group of persons defined by geographical exclusions.[25] During that time, certain territories were reconceptualized through demographic adjustments, resulting in forced displacements.[26] An important step was to update the world map to reflect new territories or accommodate displaced persons who no longer have connections to existing political territories and sovereignty.[27] Thus, mass members of people defined by their exclusion from any political community entered international politics and became the object of debate about the foundations of political order.[28] Therefore, organizing humanity into discrete sovereignties with complete control over membership meant that anyone without political status had no rights because such persons did not belong to any political community and consequently were rendered stateless.[29]

Another scholar on statelessness, Mira Siegelberg, adopts Arendt’s analysis of statelessness and explains that statelessness can be traced back to the rise of mass numbers of people without a political home after the First World War, as well as to the later nineteenth century.[30] According to Siegelberg, European imperialism, capitalism, and pan-nationalism movements at that time arguably undermined the Enlightenment-era ideals of citizenship and equality under the law.[31] The United Nations, established on October 24, 1954 as the successor to the League of Nations, made efforts to broaden the concept of human rights in the context of the ongoing European refugee crisis, positing that the idea of modern homelessness reveals that access to basic human rights and existential dignity stems from membership in a particular sovereign and political community.[32] Thus, a person who does not belong to such a political community has no right to leverage any existential or fundamental principles that dignify a human being.[33]

Further, people migrate from one country to another for several reasons.[34] Some migrations are forceful, while others are not.[35] Some people cross territorial lines to seek protection from humanitarian crises. In contrast, others seek protection from political persecution, and some individuals are on the move in search of a “better life” to improve their quality of life.[36] However, there is a growing trend of hostility towards migrant groups like IDPs regardless of the reasons for their migration.[37] The current inter-war period, as described above, also fits the description of “the age of borders,” characterized by a significant influx of migrants from underdeveloped to developed countries. Scholars also state that “[c]urbing . . . migration pressures is difficult . . . [because] [s]ealed borders are virtually needed to keep future migration stocks at their current level.”[38]

Following the World Wars, statelessness was not a global epidemic; therefore, the international community deemed it unnecessary to address the issue directly.[39] The international community did not initially view the legal consequences of statelessness as problematic, largely due to the notion that stateless persons were merely refugees, causing perennial problems to the international order and hindering resettlement after the World Wars.[40] Thus, the international community did not fully appreciate the nuances of statelessness as a potential catalyst for a global crisis.[41]

To orient the international community and other stakeholders, a few people responded through the narrow lens of viewing stateless persons as a mere extension of refugees.[42] However, one response noted that a stateless person differs from a refugee in terms of their definitions and circumstances.[43] For instance, Patrick M. Malin, a former U.S. congressman, argued that stateless persons should be defined as persons legally deprived of their citizenship and non-repatriable refugees.[44] This proposed definition does not disconnect stateless and displaced persons but says that while the two migrating groups are different, statelessness is an umbrella that comprises persons without a formal connection to any state and those refugees who do not wish to return home or those who have been forced to return to places contrary to their wish, in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement under international law.[45]

ii. Why Examine Statelessness?

Identifying stateless persons and examining the subject helps to understand the relationship between states, their nationals, and residents.[46] It evaluates how states meet their obligations under international law and its peremptory norms to identify stateless people in their territory so that they can access the minimum fundamental human rights that dignity requires.[47] Furthermore, because statelessness is a global problem, examining the subject strengthens the efforts of states to assess the size and situation of the stateless population living within their territory.[48] This exercise increases understanding of the interrelatedness of human rights, the notions of sovereignty, and territorial integrity.[49] Furthermore, studying statelessness also helps create a national and global cohesive database that will enable stateless persons to find avenues for regularization as nationals.[50] This will significantly reduce the risk of arbitrary detention by state forces, as stateless individuals often lack official identification documents.[51]

Moreover, studying statelessness also helps to preserve cultures and family lineages.[52] To be stateless is not a death sentence. The Author of this piece believes that a country with effective recording and documentation strategies could preserve the history of stateless persons and facilitate reunification with their ancestral identities, territories, and cultures. Furthermore, the identification of stateless persons can reveal the causes of statelessness and identify new trends, as it is illogical for states to address a problem they do not understand.[53]

Part II. Definition of Statelessness

Under Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (“1954 Convention”), a stateless person means “a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.”[54] This definition is part of customary international law, also known as jus cogens.[55] The meaning or implication is that the definition of a stateless person by the Convention must be interpreted in line with the ordinary sense of the text of the Convention, must be read in context, and must bear in mind the treaty’s object and purpose as provided by Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”).[56] This provision of the Vienna Convention establishes how treaties must be interpreted in a manner that does not defeat their objects and purposes, especially when they are human rights treaties.[57] Here, the 1954 Convention’s object and purpose are to ensure that stateless persons can access and can enjoy their fundamental and existential human rights guaranteed in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UHDR”).[58] Importantly, the 1954 Convention adopts a declaratory rather than constitutive definition of statelessness: a person is stateless whenever they meet the elements in Article 1(1) of the Convention.[59] The recognition of statehood and its role in the protection of stateless persons is discussed in the next subhead.

A. Constituent Elements of the 1954 Convention’s Definition of Statelessness

Elements are the components of a term that must be present to fully or affirmatively prove a legal claim as a whole.[60] Here, to understand the focus and description of the 1954 Convention, the following elements of a stateless person are as follows:

i. “A Person”

Personhood in law could apply to a legal person (entity) and a natural person.[61] A legal person is treated as a natural person capable of engaging in all usual legal business that a natural person can participate in.[62] Like a corporate entity, a legal person always has a place of incorporation or places of usual business, evidenced by a certificate of incorporation or registration.[63] Here, the implied reading of the Convention’s scope is that statelessness affects “natural” human beings, not artificial or legal persons. Conventionally, international law and human rights laws seek to protect natural human beings, such as stateless persons, who lack a nationality.[64] Further, the rights and status protected by the 1954 Convention pertain to natural human beings, not legal persons.[65] Therefore, only a natural person can become stateless.[66]

ii. “Not Considered as a National by . . . Law”

The second element of the 1954 Convention’s definition is that, as a natural person living in a state’s territory, the state does not consider him or her as a national according to its nationality laws. This element contradicts the provisions of the UDHR, which states that “everyone has the right to a nationality” and that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality.”[67] “Law,” in this context, is a hydra-headed concept that comprises legislation, soft laws (policies), judicial decisions (precedents), and applicable customs that have the binding force of law.[68] The overarching principle is that states’ laws must not be repugnant to human rights and international norms (jus cogens) on the rights of stateless persons.[69] The law could become a mechanism for statelessness in a few instances. For example, states might design their nationality laws and administrative policies to exclude residents who do not meet their nationality requirements.[70] States might also develop discriminatory laws that prevent parents from transferring nationality to their children due to gender restrictions.[71] In other instances, there could be a conflict of laws on nationality, for example, when determining the nationality of foundlings or adopted children.[72]

Further, not being considered as a national of a state also means that a state could use its laws to exclude or determine the processes of acquisition, renunciation, loss or deprivation of nationality even when the processes do not interfere with the provisions of international law, which may eventually lead to statelessness.[73] For example, a state’s national law and policy might trigger a loss of nationality status by operation of law, a mandate known as ex lege.[74] Where the operation of law does not trigger the loss or acquisition of nationality, it may occur through factual or objective evidence, such as a document recording system.[75] For example, a state might require a citizenship certificate or other documents as conclusive evidence of nationality. In this instance, a person may become stateless if there are no conclusive documents to substantiate a claim of nationality or membership in the state.

iii. Under the Laws of any State

The third component of the Convention’s definition of a stateless person is being excluded from nationality by the nationality “laws and policies” of a “state.”[76] Here, the status of statehood is instructive in understanding who a stateless person is. Only a state actor in line with international law may recognize a person as stateless.[77] Statehood must comply with the components outlined in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States.[78] The Convention provides that a “state” must possess a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to conduct international relations.[79] A non-state actor may not denationalize or nationalize a stateless person because the entity lacks both international and domestic sovereignty and recognition.[80]

Part III. The Causes of Statelessness

A person can be born stateless or lose their nationality later in life and consequently become stateless.[81] Several reasons may trigger statelessness. People usually acquire a nationality automatically at birth through either their parents or the country where they were born.[82] This Part outlines some common causes of statelessness, including conflicting nationality laws, administrative loopholes in accessing nationality, arbitrary deprivation of nationality, forced migration, population displacement, renunciation of nationality, gender-based discrimination, and inadequate safeguards in nationality laws.

A. Discrimination: Race, Ethnicity, Religion, Language, or Gender

Generally, a significant cause of statelessness is discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, language, or gender.[83] States can also deprive citizens of their nationality through changes in law using discriminatory criteria that leave whole populations stateless.[84] The majority of the world’s known stateless populations belong to minority groups.[85] For example, gender discrimination in nationality laws is a significant cause of childhood statelessness.[86] As discussed, infra Part IV.A.iv, in this guise, some countries still have laws that do not allow women to pass on their nationality on equal terms with men.[87] Nations have laws that establish the grounds for acquiring or losing nationality; some of these grounds are influenced by gender-based discrimination.[88]

B. Conflict of Nationality Laws

Another cause of statelessness is a conflict of nationality laws.[89] Here, people may move from their birth nations to another country where they face conflicting nationality laws.[90] This conflict may make it impractical for them to acquire another nationality in their current country if they have already lost their birthplace’s nationality due to long-term settlement.[91] Therefore, conflicting laws may give rise to the risk of statelessness.[92] For example, a child born in a foreign country can risk becoming stateless if that country does not permit nationality based on birth alone (that is, it grants nationality based on descent from a national) and if the country of origin does not allow a parent to pass on nationality to children born abroad.[93] Such a situation can leave entire generations stateless. Worthy of note is the nationality of the foundlings. Foundlings are children, usually babies, who have been abandoned by their parents and then discovered and cared for by others.[94] It is important to note that not all children abandoned at churches and monasteries fit the legal description of foundlings.[95] A child could be abandoned but had been registered as a citizen of a state before being abandoned.[96] Foundlings under international law are abandoned children with no traceable blood relatives or nationality.[97] Article 2 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness stipulates that: “[a] foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within that territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.”[98]

Further, “foundling” refers to a “person of unknown parents who is a child” when found in a territory.[99] Some cogent issues arise from understanding foundling persons, such as determining the “required age of the child” when found.[100] There are instances when contracting state parties do not identify abandoned children that may be identified as foundlings because of age limitations. For example, when the police discover an abandoned child, they could say the child is “too old” to be called a “foundling” and that the term “foundling” only applies to newborn babies. On the other hand, some state agents could say that an abandoned child is old enough to be responsible for their status and identify or trace who their parents are and where they were born.[101] These possibilities could render a foundling perpetually stateless. Also, there are instances where individuals cannot prove their nationality because, upon reaching adulthood, they realize that their birthplace and parentage were not documented or registered at the time of their birth, thus rendering them stateless.[102] Here, recognizing these persons as stateless is within Article 2 of the 1961 Convention, which obliges states to resolve their statelessness by identifying them as state nationals and adjudicating them as stateless.[103] The import of the Convention is that contracting states should confer the nationality of the state where a child is found or where the child has grown into adulthood as their nationality to avoid protracted statelessness.

C. State Secession

Another cause of statelessness is “state secession” or political divorce. Secession occurs when a component state breaks away from its parent state to form a new state, or when a new state supersedes another.[104] When a part of a state secedes, it typically results in the emergence of new states and changes in territorial boundaries.[105] In many cases, specific groups can be left without nationality, and even where new countries allow nationality for all, ethnic, racial, and religious minorities frequently have trouble proving their link to the country.[106] Therefore, creating new countries, transferring territory between existing countries, or altering borders can result in the exclusion of groups of people who may struggle to establish their connections to a particular country.[107]

For example, Europe has more than 600,000 stateless people due to the dissolution of former countries.[108] Ian Brownlie says, “[t]he population follows the change of sovereignty in matters of nationality.”[109] The challenge with state secession that leads to the deprivation of nationality is that, though international law mandates that states avoid statelessness or deprivation of nationality, it does not impose any duty on a seceding state or a state successor to grant nationality to members of a former parent state.[110] Therefore, the acquisition and loss of nationality are matters for states to regulate under their municipal law according to their interests and expectations.[111] A nation must be able to determine under its legal system who its nationals are.[112] In countries where nationality is only acquired by descent from a national, statelessness will be passed on to the next generation. Statelessness can also be caused by loss or deprivation of nationality.[113] Here, denationalization, which can occur when citizens lose their nationality due to prolonged residence outside their country, triggers statelessness. In some countries, citizens can lose their nationality simply by residing outside their country for an extended period. Individuals may be at risk of statelessness if they cannot prove their links to a state. In some instances, the lack of birth registrations or nationality documentation to prove a person’s place of birth and parentage triggers statelessness. It is apt to note that being undocumented is not the same as being stateless. However, a lack of birth registration can put people at risk of statelessness, just as a birth certificate provides proof of a person’s place of birth and parentage, which is critical information needed to establish their nationality.

D. Revocation of Nationality or Denial of Birthright Citizenship

Another cause of statelessness is the state practice of revoking nationality as a form of punishment for committing a crime—a state can also determine who is eligible for its legal membership. As seen in the case of Hamdi, infra Part II.E, a state may revoke nationality on specific grounds if the process is not arbitrary. However, states have been enjoined from revoking or stripping nationality as a pretext to achieve particular political or public policy objectives, because such persons could be at risk of becoming stateless.[114] This Article advocates that states should be cautious of the deliberate use of citizenship policy as a way to suppress or punish unwanted behavior or civil disobedience. For example, individuals who have deserted the military should not be penalized by losing their nationality or citizenship for their actions.[115] Succinctly, Chief Justice Warren, in the case of Trop v. Dulles,[116] explained that the:

[U]se of denationalization as a punishment . . . is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the development. The punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political community. His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens to find himself. While any one country may accord him some rights, and presumably as long as he remained in this country he would enjoy the limited rights of an alien, no country need do so because he is stateless. Furthermore, his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an alien might be subject to termination at any time by reason of deportation. In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.[117]

According to Justice Warren’s opinion above, states should refrain from using denationalization as a form of punishment when less severe legal alternatives can effectively address harmful behaviors detrimental to national development. For instance, the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits denationalization as punishment, as involuntary removal of citizenship is considered a form of torture.[118] States that do not physically torture their citizens but resort to punitive denationalization still commit human rights violations similar to those found in regimes that practice physical torture.

E. Renunciation of Nationality

Statelessness may occur when nationals from countries that do not allow dual citizenship renounce their nationality and accept another country’s nationality. If they lose their new nationality, they may be required to relinquish it and leave the country. Statelessness occurs if no replacement nationality exists. If a person renounces citizenship without holding another nationality, they are left without any legal nationality, which is precisely the definition of statelessness under the 1954 Convention: “A person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.”[119] In Vance v. Terrazas, the Court established that an individual renouncing his citizenship must do so both voluntarily and with a specific intent to expatriate and that such intent must be either directly expressed or reasonably inferred from an established conduct.[120] The case of Joel Slater is a direct example of express and voluntary renunciation leading to statelessness.[121] Slater officially renounced his U.S. citizenship in 1987 at the U.S. Consulate in Perth, Australia, to politically protest U.S. foreign policy, and received a Certificate of Loss of Nationality.[122] Various international courts have also faced the question of how to determine the political status of stateless individuals.[123] In Austria, a Serbian national living in Austria received a letter of assurance that she would obtain Austrian nationality, contingent on renouncing her Serbian citizenship.[124] She renounced Serbian nationality (as required), but later lost her Austrian nationality because she did not meet other ongoing requirements (such as income).[125] Since her former citizenship had already been renounced and Austrian nationality was never officially confirmed, she became stateless. The Austrian Court declared “unconstitutional the law which requires continuous fulfillment of all the conditions for naturalization, even after Austrian nationality has been conditionally granted and the former nationality has been renounced.”[126] However, the Austrian Court did not explicitly engage with the concept of statelessness and only resolved the constitutional question.[127]

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld[128] is an instance of forced political statelessness—the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision is instructive on the Court’s posture towards an “enemy combatant.” Hamdi, the American-born “enemy combatant” taken into custody in the aftermath of the 9⁠/⁠11 attack, was held in detention without trial for three years after the surrender of his Taliban military unit in Afghanistan.[129] The U.S. Supreme Court intervened in his case by allowing him to leave the country, provided he relinquish his citizenship pursuant to § 349(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act—a condition he agreed to with the Department of State.[130] According to this “Release Agreement,” the U.S. transferred Hamdi to Saudi Arabia on October 11, 2004, where he was raised, despite him being born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.[131] According to the Release Agreement, “Hamdi must remain in Saudi Arabia and be subject to strict travel restrictions and monitoring by the Saudi government.”[132] Because the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does not allow dual citizenship, except in some exceptional cases, it is not clear whether Saudi Arabia absorbed Hamdi and granted him its nationality.[133] What is clear is that Hamdi may no longer assert his rights as a U.S. citizen or national because the U.S. made him renounce his citizenship in return for his freedom, contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Vance.[134]

As demonstrated above, revoking a person’s sole nationality can potentially lead to statelessness or the risk of becoming stateless; the revocation of nationality as punishment for crimes is akin to the extermination of humanity. For example, in 1958, the Supreme Court barred the U.S. government from punitively revoking a person’s citizenship, calling it “a form of punishment more primitive than torture.”[135] The stance of the Court amplifies the international community’s position that statelessness can be so harmful that states should consider banning the practice of revoking citizenship as a means of punishment when the victim could be at risk of statelessness. The following discussion examines the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment concerning the principle of birthright citizenship and whether it can be revoked.

Part IV. Discussions on Birthright Citizenship of Children Born to Undocumented Immigrants in the U.S. Constitution

The Trump Administration has consistently rejects the idea of birthright citizenship and advances a position that children born to undocumented immigrants are still illegal; this anti-immigration position is expressly demonstrated through various executive orders.[136] Signed on January 20, 2025, Executive Order 14,160, Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship, outlines the legal justification and policy framework of the Trump Administration.[137] This recent executive order targets the termination of birthright citizenship for children born to parents illegally residing in the U.S.[138] It aims to redefine the Fourteenth Amendment and associated laws to omit children of undocumented immigrants.[139] The Order states that the “Fourteenth Amendment has never been interpreted to extend citizenship universally to everyone born within the U.S. The Fourteenth Amendment has always excluded from birthright citizenship persons who were born in the United States but not ‘subject to the jurisdiction thereof.’”[140] The Order goes on to describe the types of individuals who are “born in the United States and not subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”[141] These individuals include cases in which the:

[P]erson’s mother was unlawfully present in the United States and the person’s father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth, or (2) when that person’s mother’s presence in the United States at the time of said person’s birth was lawful but temporary, and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth.[142]

Arguably, this reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, as shown above, effectively eliminates birthright citizenship for individuals whose parents are not citizens. The enforcement of this Order relies on the executive’s authority over document-issuing agencies and prohibits all executive agencies and departments from issuing documents that acknowledge U.S. citizenship for individuals born in these two scenarios above.[143] The Order mandates that all departments and agencies provide public guidance on its implementation within thirty days; however, no such guidance has been published to date.[144] Enforcement of the Order was initially blocked by lower federal courts by preliminary injunctions filed by several states and individuals.[145] These challenges have been consolidated in Trump v. CASA, Inc.[146] On June 27, 2025, the Supreme Court, with a majority opinion authored by Justice Barrett, granted the Government’s application to partially stay the injunctions entered by the lower courts.[147] The Trump Administration’s brief included broad legal theories on immigration, however, not all the arguments persuaded a majority of the justices.[148]

First, the brief references Elk v. Wilkins[149] to support its interpretation of “jurisdiction” to mean “political jurisdiction” which refers to whether a person owes allegiance to the U.S., rather than “regulatory jurisdiction” which refers to whether a person must follow U.S. law.[150] Elk consequently denied birthright citizenship to Native Americans born within Indian reservations because their primary allegiance was to their tribes.[151] This interpretation would limit the Fourteenth Amendment to only granting birthright citizenship to children of parents who owe their loyalty to the U.S.[152] Second, the brief references United States v. Wong Kim Ark,[153] where the Court addressed:

[W]hether a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who at the time of his birth are subjects of the emperor of China, but have a permanent domicile and residence in the United States . . . becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States.[154]

The Court ultimately decided that such children become citizens at birth with the caveat that the parents “have a permanent domicile and residence in the United States.”[155] This ruling provides the Trump Administration with a tenuous claim and a questionable legal precedent, suggesting that birthright citizenship is only available to immigrants born to parents with permanent residence within the U.S.

Outside of this administration’s attempts to end birthright citizenship of children born to undocumented immigrants, members of the Republican Party have also introduced legislation to end it.[156] The first attempt was a Senate bill titled the Birthright Citizenship Act of 2025 which attempts to define “subject to the jurisdiction” of the U.S. in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) to cases where parents are: (1) a citizen or national of the United States; (2) a lawfully admitted permanent resident of the U.S.; or (3) a lawful alien actively serving the armed forces.[157] An identical bill was introduced in the House of Representatives.[158] One notable bill, titled Build the Wall and Deport Them All Act, seeks to enshrine many of Trump’s Executive Orders and memoranda into law.[159] Despite being a year before Trump’s second inauguration, the bill sought to limit the INA to only citizens, nationals, or lawful aliens with permanent residence.[160] The following are arguments for and against ending birthright citizenship for children of undocumented immigrants.

A. Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Termination of Birthright Citizenship in the U.S.

The debate surrounding the termination of birthright citizenship intersects constitutional law, immigration policy, and human rights.[161] Proponents support a narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and advocate for stricter immigration measures, while opponents emphasize explicit constitutional protections, relevant precedents, and the potential for societal harm. Given the existing legal framework and the potential for extensive repercussions, any effort to eliminate birthright citizenship would likely face substantial legal and political obstacles. The primary constitutional interpretation of the concept of birthright citizenship originates from the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Section 1 of the Amendment states: “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.”[162]

Here, according to the current Administration, the key phrase is “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”[163] The conventional understanding of this provision suggests that anyone born on U.S. soil (jus soli) is included, except for the offspring of foreign diplomats and hostile occupying forces, who are not entirely governed by U.S. laws. However, alternative perspectives exist. Some contend that “subject to the jurisdiction” does not encompass children of undocumented immigrants, arguing that they are not fully governed due to their parents’ unlawful presence. This view is based on Supreme Court precedent established in Wong Kim Ark.[164] The Court ruled that a child born in the U.S. to parents who are foreign nationals but are legally residing is a U.S. citizen.[165] Furthermore, this ruling strongly supports the concept of jus soli birthright citizenship and is considered a cornerstone precedent.[166] Additionally, the Court held in Elk v. Wilkins[167] that Native Americans were not automatically citizens at birth because they owed allegiance to their tribe, not the U.S.; this case is factually distinct from other immigration and citizenship cases due to the principles of tribal sovereignty.[168] Furthermore, some have argued that Congress can modify or clarify citizenship laws, yet still, the Fourteenth Amendment is a constitutional provision that limits Congress’s power to restrict citizenship rights granted by birthright.[169] The phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to excluded children born to foreign nationals who are unlawfully present or on temporary visas based on the framers “intent.”[170]

i. Risk of Statelessness

In cases of statelessness, children born in the U.S. to undocumented parents who do not receive citizenship may risk becoming stateless if their parents’ countries of origin do not provide citizenship by descent. Those who are stateless face significant legal and social challenges, including restricted access to education, healthcare, and lawful employment.[171]

ii. Enforcement Challenges

Implementing a policy to deny birthright citizenship would require a robust administrative system to verify parental status at birth, which may burden hospitals and government agencies. It risks discrimination and racial profiling, as officials may make citizenship decisions based on appearance or nationality assumptions. The Center for American Progress argues that abolishing birthright citizenship would require an intricate and expensive national birth registry, imposing a significant burden on hospitals and government entities.[172]

iii. Impact on Immigrant Families

Families may face greater insecurity and separation risks if children lack citizenship. Social and economic integration efforts could be undermined, and children could be barred from public benefits and protections tied to citizenship.[173] For example, children lacking citizenship status encounter greater risks of family separation and are more vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.[174] Without legal recognition, these children might be barred from accessing healthcare, education, and other critical services, resulting in adverse long-term effects on their health, development, and well-being. Additionally, not having citizenship may restrict their full participation in society, constraining opportunities for social and economic progress.[175] Implementing a system to confirm parental status at birth would create a considerable burden for hospitals and governmental bodies. This process would necessitate extensive documentation and coordination, resulting in increased administrative expenses and potential delays in birth registration. Additionally, enforcing such a policy could lead to racial profiling and discrimination, as officials might assess citizenship based on physical appearance or assumptions linked to nationality.[176]

iv. Potential Litigation

These policies would likely face constitutional challenges in court, potentially invoking the Fourteenth Amendment and established Supreme Court precedents. This situation could result in lengthy legal disputes and uncertainty for the families involved. Thus, supporters depend on a more limited interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment alongside a focus on immigration control. In contrast, critics highlight existing legal precedents, constitutional rights, and the societal repercussions of denying citizenship.[177]

C. Arguments For Ending Birthright Citizenship for Children of Undocumented Immigrants

As earlier said, the topic of birthright citizenship for children of undocumented immigrants has sparked fierce debates, especially in countries grappling with immigration policies and national identity issues. Proponents of abolishing birthright citizenship argue that the current system encourages illegal immigration, strains public resources, and undermines the rule of law.[178] They contend that citizenship should be tied to legal residence or parentage, rather than just birthplace, to ensure national membership is meaningful and regulated.[179] This Article evaluates the main arguments of reform advocates, focusing on concerns about immigration enforcement, social integration, and the perceived fairness of granting citizenship to those born to undocumented parents. Here are some arguments in support of the notion.

i. Control of Immigration Policy & Preserving the Value of Citizenship

Supporters of immigration control argue that birthright citizenship can incentivize illegal immigration by granting automatic citizenship to children born on U.S. soil, regardless of their parents’ legal status.[180] Ending it could reduce what they see as “birth tourism” or unauthorized entry aimed at securing citizenship for offspring.[181] Proponents of revoking birthright citizenship of children born to undocumented immigrants argue that limiting birthright citizenship safeguards the value and importance of American citizenship against perceived automatic entitlement, which aids in preserving national sovereignty and regulating who gains citizenship.[182]

D. Arguments Against Ending Birthright Citizenship for Children of Undocumented Immigrants

Critics argue that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers automatic citizenship on anyone born in the U.S., regardless of their parents’ immigration status, a position strong supported by Court precedent like Wong Kim Ark.[183]

ii. Impact on Civil Rights and Social Integration

Critics argue that the revocation of birthright citizenship may adversely affect immigrant communities, undermine confidence in the legal system, and obstruct integration efforts, potentially giving rise to further discrimination and social fragmentation.[184] And children will likely be the group most impacted by the lack of social integration.

Ending birthright citizenship may lead to a group of stateless people or uncertainties concerning citizenship status, making it difficult for children who would otherwise be regarded as citizens.[185] Additionally, ending birthright citizenship is directly contrary to international law and will invoke as detailed below a response from the international community to the influx of stateless people.[186]

Part V. The Response of the International Community to Statelessness

After World War II, displaced persons, including refugees, migrants, internally displaced persons, and stateless individuals, flooded the Atlantic World, prompting states to adjust their laws to accommodate them and allow them to settle within their territories.[187] For example, the U.S. enacted the notorious McCarran–Walter Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which largely preserved the discriminatory national-origins quota system that favored Northwestern Europeans.[188] It primarily kept immigration limited based on ethnicity, but made allowances in the quotas for persons displaced by World War II and allowed increased immigration of European refugees.[189] It also ended Asian exclusion from immigrating to the U.S. and introduced a system of preferences based on skill sets and family reunification.[190]

At the international level, the United Nations created agreements that define what it means to be stateless.[191] These agreements provided exceptions to the general presumption that states have an inalienable right to decide who they consider their members and whether or not they recognize individuals crossing their borders as legal residents.[192] Moreover, these international agreements provided the basic rules for living outside the boundaries of states and seeking entry into them.[193] Depending on whether these agreements or treaties were self-executing or not, most states responded to these international agreements by incorporating those treaties into their legal systems through the enactment of local legislation. Those treaties allowed states to adopt descent and birth as the basis for citizenship and provided guidelines for naturalization. Two of those international agreements are the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1954, and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.[194] The 1954 Convention, discussed supra, establishes a framework for the international protection of stateless persons and is the most comprehensive codification of the rights of stateless persons yet attempted at the international level.[195] Whether this framework should become codified as local legislation by member states of the United Nations is a valuable discussion addressed in this Article’s recommendations on how to end statelessness.

Moreover, even with states ratifying the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, significant challenges remain in implementing these treaties to ensure they are enforceable within their jurisdictions. I argue that some states may be reluctant to implement measures that offer sustainable solutions, like providing documentation to substitute for passports for stateless individuals. States might worry that by improving the status of these people, they could inadvertently encourage a larger influx of stateless individuals into their regions, fearing they would bear this responsibility alone. I further argue that any legislation aimed at improving the status of stateless persons should encompass a comprehensive array of provisions that impact various areas of national law. Additionally, convincing parliaments to adopt reform would be difficult because some provisions introduce novel and intricate law, which when implemented, immediately grant legal residency to many stateless persons. Resistance to this idea may also arise due to the limited legislative and economic resources available to meet the needs of stateless individuals, especially since many of their urgent issues are socio-economic.

A. Global Effects and Consequences of Statelessness

Statelessness has a profoundly negative impact on the protection and integrity of stateless individuals. In Zadvydas v. Davis,[196] the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that statelessness signifies the complete annihilation of a person’s standing in an organized society. It constitutes a punishment more fundamental than torture, as it eradicates the political existence that took centuries to establish.[197] Statelessness has severe lifelong and devastating impacts on those it affects, which result in stateless persons having no legal protection, and includes being generally denied basic rights, such as: education, healthcare, employment, housing, marriage, freedom of movement, political participation during their lifetime, and even the dignity of an official burial and a death certificate when they die.[198] The Court recognizes the results of statelessness, and the reasoning of the Justices can be used as a possible legal case law framework for other international courts.

i. Denial of Nationality and the Privilege to Enjoy Basic Human Rights

Because a stateless person lacks the nationality of any country, they cannot enjoy fundamental socioeconomic and civil-political rights tied to nationality. Their exclusion from nationality profoundly marks their lives, as well as those of their families and communities, in dramatic ways. Yet, while statelessness is a serious problem, it could be addressed through intentional legislative changes in national laws and policies. Additionally, most people are citizens of a particular country, holding birth certificates, passports, identification cards, driver’s licenses, and health insurance cards or documents.[199] Stateless persons do not exist on paper, so it may not be statistically correct to assume that a certain number of persons are stateless globally.[200] There are countries with little or no data on how they track statelessness, as most countries do not register and count stateless persons within their territories.[201] Further, stateless persons “often are not able to go to school, see a doctor, work legally, open a bank account, buy a house, or even get married.”[202] Statelessness is the enemy of the common good and humanity, and it respects no domestic or international boundaries or legal systems.[203] Moreover, statelessness can emerge from the chaos of fleeing war; while fleeing, families may lose the papers that prove their ties to a country, and that could make registering a child’s birth impossible, leaving them stateless or at risk of being stateless.[204] In some instances, borders can shift or dissolve completely—for example, the statelessness that occurred after the fall of the Soviet Union.[205] In nations that define nationality mainly through descent from a citizen, or jus sanguinis, children of stateless parents will also be stateless after major political events. This generational transfer of statelessness occurs because a stateless person is unable to grant citizenship to their offspring, resulting in the absence of a nationality for these children.[206]

ii. The Indignity of Belonging Nowhere

Another consequence of statelessness is that stateless individuals have no place to belong. For them, each day highlights the rights they lack and the challenging quest for acknowledgment that often seems unattainable. Being stateless involves more than simply lacking documents proving nationality; it encompasses the dignity of belonging to a nation or society and the acceptance that demonstrates everyone has a place they can call home.[207] It is difficult to define the notion of dignity. Whether through philosophical or religious lenses, it is unlikely to provide a common universal standard for deciding what it means to dignify humans or to subject them to indignities.[208] One practical way to find a universally acceptable meaning of human dignity could be found in searching references to human dignity in national constitutions. Scholars have identified usage patterns that suggest a consensus on specific understandings of dignity.[209] Most national constitutions have understood human dignity in terms of bodily integrity or protection.[210] The violation of a person’s physical integrity is seen as an insult or reduction of the victim’s dignity. In the U.S., courts have referenced dignity in ruling against violations of bodily integrity under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment.”[211] Moreover, international human rights treaties strengthen the constitutional agreement to protect individuals from governmental abuses by banning any instance of “torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”[212]

Apart from bodily protection as a form of dignity, dignity represents not only the intrinsic or “existential” worth of human beings, but also the moral duty states owe their citizens to not torture or brutalize their bodies.[213] Here, the notion of dignity entails a basic or the minimum core living conditions that amplify the existence of a human being. Human worth is a fundamental and inalienable quality that every person possesses simply because they are human, regardless of their background or identity. Recognizing this inherent value is essential to fostering respect and understanding among individuals, as it goes beyond personal achievements or character and underscores our shared humanity. Embracing this perspective can lead to more compassionate interactions and a more inclusive society.[214]

Connecting the two descriptions of dignity to stateless persons establishes that they deserve protection from the arbitrary violation of their bodily integrity while stateless. They also deserve living conditions that validate their existence as human beings and not as humans deemed “superfluous” qua humans.[215] Stateless individuals lack proof of nationality, which does not diminish their humanity. In a world where society is organized around national borders, states with significant numbers of stateless persons or residents should provide these individuals with nationality or take measures to prevent statelessness. Demonstrating a commitment to protecting these vulnerable people reflects the value placed on the dignity of stateless individuals. Stateless individuals are only free from physical torture, as their host states do not directly harm their bodies. However, they experience psychological distress as they live each day teetering on the edge of being excluded from humanity, confronting the harsh reality that they do not belong anywhere.

iii. Forced Displacement

Another effect of statelessness is the tendency to be increasingly aggravated by forced displacement. The UNHCR defines “forced displacement” as “a result of persecution, conflict, generalized violence or human rights violations.”[216] This Article highlights three key connections between statelessness and forced displacement. First, statelessness leads to forced displacement when a stateless population suffers disproportionate human rights violations, with no option but to move elsewhere for palliatives. Second, it also occurs when people risk becoming stateless due to displacement, for instance, because they cannot prove their links to their home country. Third, statelessness can increase their vulnerability to further displacement.[217] A contemporary example is the Rohingya stateless population. The Bangladesh government refers to the Rohingyas as “forcibly displaced Myanmar nationals” (“FDMNs”).[218] In 1982, Myanmar revised its citizenship law, essentially depriving the Rohingya of their nationality, although they have lived in Rakhine, a part of Burma, for generations.[219] This leaves FDMNs without freedom of movement, education, health, employment in the civil service, and land ownership. They have also been the target of serious human rights violations, prompting many to flee their homes and risk their lives in hope of finding a haven in nearby countries.[220] In addition, in 1989, an estimated 75,000 Black Mauritanians were denationalized, and a significant number were deported across the borders into Senegal and Mali, where they lived for years as stateless refugees.[221]

iv. Restrictions on Transferrable Nationality to Children & Gender-Discrimination

Another ordeal stateless persons face is the restriction on transferring nationality to children born abroad. Being born within a state’s geographical territory is crucial to a child’s life because the child secures the ability to be recognized as a human being with the privileges of nationality or citizenship of that state immediately from birth. If a child does not secure nationality at birth, there is a propensity that such a child will be left stateless for a lifetime—a stateless child has no legal recognition or access to any documentation that may allow access to healthcare, registered names, education, social assistance, and other benefits mentioned under the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.[222] Some countries prevent parents from passing on their nationality to their children if they are born abroad.[223] For instance, specific nationality laws that deny women equal rights with men in conferring nationality on their children contribute to statelessness, raising concerns of gender-discrimination for the UNHCR as part of its mandate to prevent and mitigate this issue.[224] Some obnoxious customary practices make women “objects” of inheritance as part of the estate of their deceased husbands.[225] About twenty-seven countries do not allow mothers to confer their nationality on their children, but their fathers may do so.[226]

Because of this discrimination and its impact on children, the UNHCR has published an annual background note addressing gender equality in the legal aspects of nationality laws related to granting nationality to children since 2012.[227] It is commendable that, unlike around sixty years ago, most states’ nationality laws now grant equal rights to women in matters of nationality.[228] This transformation significantly improved following the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”) in 1979.[229]

Despite the successful implementation of CEDAW, which allows men and women to pass nationality to their children, as noted above, some countries that have yet to comply with the Treaty—or that are not its signatories—still discriminate against women and do not allow them to pass their nationality to their children.[230] A convincing argument exists that to eliminate statelessness, a key strategy is to ensure women have equal rights to pass on their nationality to their children. This way, in cases where the father passes away before granting nationality to children born during the marriage, the mother can transfer her nationality, helping prevent her children from becoming stateless.

Furthermore, the starting point for protecting a child’s rights is not at the international level, but within the laws of the state in which the child was born. Because international law does not confer nationality at birth, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness mandates that states grant nationality to persons born in their territory who had no prior nationality.[231] The centrality of the Convention is the prevention of statelessness at birth by requiring states to grant citizenship to children born in their territory or born to their nationals abroad, who would otherwise be stateless.[232] Under this Convention, states, as a matter of law, are at liberty to give nationality to a child born in their territory or by nationalization, which requires a child born in a state’s territory to apply for the state’s nationality upon fulfilling any legal requirements.[233]

Another necessary provision of the 1961 Statelessness Convention is Article 1(3), which aims to avoid statelessness by mandating nations to apply the principle of jus sanguinis instead of jus soli.[234] Jus sanguinis is Latin for “right of blood” and refers to countries that grant citizenship by descent, while jus soli is a rule of law that a child’s nationality is determined by their place of birth.[235] According to Gerard-René de Groot, while the negotiation of the 1961 Statelessness Convention was ongoing, some nations practiced jus sanguinis, a principle that only male nationals could transmit their nationality to their children.[236] Consequently, female nationals could only transmit their nationality to children born out of wedlock if paternity was not established.[237] Hence, the children of a mother who was a national and a father who was stateless or could not transmit his nationality would be born stateless. Consequently, the 1961 Convention provides a stopgap to this predicament in its Article 1(3), which allows the acquisition of the birth country’s nationality for children born in the territory of a state of which their mother is a national or if they will otherwise become stateless.[238]

It is the obligation of the state where a child is born to confer the recognition of citizenship on the child. However, there are instances where a state fails to confer such recognition, and a child may seek protection through specific international law instruments. For example, as mentioned earlier in this Article, Article 15 of the UDHR guarantees citizenship or nationality as a human right, because everyone has the right to nationality, and no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of their nationality or denied the right to change their nationality.[239] However, the UDHR does not explicitly proscribe statelessness.[240] The text of the article under review only prohibits “arbitrary statelessness.”[241] It appears to permit states to take actions that may render individuals stateless, provided they are not done arbitrarily.[242] Arguably, Article 15(1) is currently under review and is unclear on how children may access nationality and which state is obligated to grant such nationality at birth.[243] It guarantees a nationality right to which every human being is entitled. Comparatively, Article 24(3) of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) states that “every child has the right to acquire a nationality.”[244] It is noteworthy that the ICCPR is more specific about children’s nationality.[245] It does not specify how and where a child can obtain nationality recognition, but still imposes an obligation on states not to deprive children of their nationality and to implement the provision in a way that gives a child reasonable access or opportunity to exercise their right to acquire a nationality.[246] Generally, the ICCPR contains negative rights that a state may not violate without legal recourse.[247] It imposes obligations on states not to act in any manner that may deprive anyone of their civil or political rights.[248]

A corollary to Article 24(3) of the ICCPR is Article 24(2), which obligates states to ensure that children are registered at birth.[249] An action phrase that the Convention uses is “immediately at birth.”[250] The implication is that children have the right to be registered immediately after birth, allowing for the early conferral of nationality and thereby avoiding the problem of statelessness, without any form of discrimination based on race, sex, or ethnicity.[251] The challenge to this provision is that states do not implement the object and purpose of the Convention as they ought to. Further, the immediacy of a child’s registration at birth means that the child shall have the right to a name and the right to acquire a nationality.[252] The Convention prohibits any situation that may render a child stateless at birth by obliging states to implement this provision by their national law and obligations under other international instruments in situations where a child would be stateless.[253]

The challenge is whether a state automatically allows a treaty’s domestication or is subject to other internal legislative requirements for a treaty to become part of its laws. For example, the U.S. has signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child, however, it has yet to ratify it as binding or practical for protecting the child.[254] This is because not all treaties are self-executing in the U.S. and Congress would be required to make laws on whether a treaty could be identified as either self-executing or non-self-executing by looking at various indicators.[255] A possible reason for the delay of implementing the Convention of the Rights of the Child is that the federal government and states already have adequate laws protecting children in the U.S.[256]

Further, there is no absolute obligation for a state to confer its citizenship on a child born in its territory. However, the ICCPR requires states to adopt some appropriate measures internally and in alignment with other sovereign states to ensure that every child has a nationality at birth.[257] The Convention does not make citizenship at birth an automatic right to be recognized by a state.[258] Still, a child must have some meaningful access to nationality without any form of discrimination. The Convention further stresses that national laws should admit no discrimination in the acquisition of nationality between legitimate children and children born out of wedlock or to stateless parents or based on the nationality status of one or both parents.[259] Therefore, neither the ICCPR nor the CRC mandates that states confer citizenship by jus soli or jus sanguinis, that is, nationality on a child born in the territory of a state nor is it automatic that nationality is acquired at birth.[260] States do have the obligation under these Conventions to provide the necessary measures to prevent statelessness to ensure that children have access to a nationality.[261] While the measures to be taken by states are not transparent or specific, one could argue that the measures from the two Conventions aimed at preventing a child from being deprived of nationality apply to both the child’s country of birth and the parent’s country of nationality. A child should have access to citizenship not just by their place of birth, but by extension to residence and parentage.

Worthy of mention is the significance of a regional instrument that ensures the guarantee of nationality to children in Africa. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child provides for a child’s right to nationality.[262] It provides that every child has the right to acquire a nationality. It further says:

States Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to ensure that their constitutional legislation recognize[s] the principles according to which a child shall acquire the nationality of the state in the territory of which he has been born if, at the time of the child’s birth, he is not granted nationality by any other state in accordance with its laws.[263]

The African Charter mandates that states constitutionally recognize the principle of giving nationality in cases where children may be at risk of statelessness.[264]

v. The Adoption of Stateless Children

A pivotal issue here is addressing the nationality of adopted children. Adoption is when a person assumes the parenting of another, usually a child, from that person’s biological or legal parent or parents.[265] Legal adoptions permanently transfer all rights and responsibilities, along with filiation, from the biological parents to the adoptive parents.[266] An international law governing adoption authority is the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (“Hague Convention”), adopted on May 29, 1993.[267] One of the Convention’s expectations is that post-adoption, an adopted child’s nationality should mirror that of an unadopted or biological child.[268] There must be no difference between an adopted child and a biological child because the former has become a member of the adopter’s family, having the same rights and obligations that flow from the adopter’s nationality. Like most international law agreements, a major challenge of the Adoption Convention is that it is non-self-executing. Implementation has been challenging because states must harmonize Convention requirements with their already existing laws and policies that govern adoption in their jurisdictions.[269] The importance of the Hague Convention lies in its recognition that an adopted child may lose their nationality as a result of the adoption process.[270] To prevent being rendered stateless, the Convention renders the child’s adoption contingent on the possession of another nationality.[271] Therefore, whether an adoption order is issued in the adopting parents’ state or abroad, a child must not be left stateless due to differences in states’ laws on the recognition of adoption.

vi. Ethnic Cleansing

Stateless persons face the possibility of “ethnic cleansing.”[272] International law does not define the term “ethnic cleansing.” Still, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the Security Council, and the United Nations General Assembly have all used the term in their resolutions and judgments.[273] Comparatively, the Statute of the International Criminal Court, which was adopted in July 1998 and entered into force on July 1, 2002, does not define the term “ethnic cleansing,” but provides precise definitions of crimes against humanity and war crimes, which encompass the acts that constitute ethnic cleansing.[274] These definitions include the main elements that constitute the practice of ethnic cleansing, such as widespread and systematic killings, disappearances, population transfers, rape, persecution, and other similarly inhumane acts.[275] The term means rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.[276] Moreover, ethnic cleansing “is a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”[277] Ethnic cleansing against stateless persons aims to artificially create geographic zones for them, especially by using violent methods to remove them from where they know as “home” into places they are not familiar with.[278] Stateless persons are more vulnerable when identified in clustered groups as a population lacking a nationality or identity, this can result in marginalized grouped becoming isolated, unaccounted for, and vulnerable to political violence.[279]

B. How International Law Prevents Statelessness

The legal frameworks of protection offered by international law to stateless persons are the provisions of the 1954 Convention, discussed above, and the 1951 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.[280] The 1954 Convention defines a de jure stateless person as someone who is not considered a national by any state under the operation of its law.[281] The International Law Commission has adopted that definition as part of customary international law.[282] About eighty states ratified the Convention between 2014 and 2015.[283] It is inferable that de facto statelessness may exist when someone who once had a nationality lost it or it has become ineffective, or when a person outside their country of nationality is unable to enjoy that country’s protection. There is no definition of de facto statelessness under international law or the UNHCR statistical report.[284] The term “de facto stateless persons” has become recognized due to irregular or forced migration paradigms and in cases where a country has refused its nationals reentry on several grounds that do not involve criminal imputations.[285] The committee that drafted the 1961 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons referred to the term “de facto stateless persons.”[286] Resolution No. 1 of that Convention recommended that “persons who are stateless de facto should as far as possible be treated as stateless de jure to enable them to acquire an effective nationality.”[287] It is arguable that because international law does not recognize the notion of de facto statelessness, it could lead to a narrow interpretation of the concept of statelessness that may cause ambiguity in the description of who falls into the de jure stateless persons under Article 1(1) of the 1954 Refugee Convention. For example, Article 15 of the UDHR says “[e]veryone has the right to a nationality” and “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his [or her] nationality.”[288] The Declaration does not condemn the notion of deprivation of nationality; what it condemns or prohibits is “the arbitrary deprivation of nationality.”[289] Here, “arbitrary” means acts that are based on random choice or personal whims rather than on any reason or system, so an arbitrary deprivation occurs when a state takes actions based on such whims that violate human rights and leave certain individuals without a remedy at law.[290] Moreover, the UDHR also places an obligation on states to ensure that their actions do not render people stateless or create a risk of statelessness.[291] Other international and regional instruments obligate states to prevent statelessness and discourage the arbitrary loss of nationality.[292] For example, the American Convention on Human Rights and the Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms prohibit the arbitrary deprivation of nationality.[293] By contrast, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights do not include the exception of “arbitrariness” in their provisions, but only mention and guarantee the right to nationality as an absolute right.[294] In fact, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has used “arbitrary interference with human rights” to mean when states make laws that are incompatible with the provisions, object, and purpose of human rights treaties to which they are signatories.[295] Here, one could argue that a state’s action to deprive its “people” of their nationality is arbitrary if it results in statelessness or the risk of being stateless.[296]

C. The Role of International Law in Unknown and Undetermined Nationality

International law places an obligation on states to make efforts to identify persons whose nationality may be unknown or difficult to determine.[297] The importance of this obligation is that there are persons whose identity cannot be defined or known because they have links to multiple countries or do not possess any nationality and are at risk of being stateless.[298] To avoid statelessness, states need to be proactive in creating helpful preliminary strategies to determine the risks of becoming stateless for persons who are likely to be described as persons with unknown nationality or whose nationalities are under investigation. The preliminary review needs to be done as soon as possible and should prevent the protraction of an unknown national status from becoming a pathway to statelessness. Under international law, the concept of being at risk of statelessness is not a well-established idea. Still, it addresses individuals with a nationality who are at risk of becoming stateless due to discriminatory restrictions and other loopholes in nationality laws.[299] The term is also used to describe a person without proof of nationality and at risk of not being recognized as a national.[300] Here, the possession of nationality is not established, and calling them stateless is not accurate either. This person’s nationality is undetermined, and they are at risk of statelessness. Indeed, a person could have a birth certificate and still be at risk of statelessness because a birth certificate may not be sufficient to establish a nationality.

Part VI. Comparing Stateless Persons and Refugees

For many reasons, comparing the legal regimes of stateless persons and refugees is paramount. One reason is the overarching provision of Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention, which applies to two categories of stateless persons: migratory stateless persons, who have already fled their country of residence to another and as a result, are also asylum seekers, and non-migratory stateless persons, who are stateless but have never crossed into another country.[301] The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol also define and protect refugees.[302] According to this Convention, a refugee meets the definition outlined in the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which is any person:

Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, [he] is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.[303]

The U.S. definition of a refugee varies from the one presented in the 1951 Refugee Convention. While the U.S. has not officially ratified this Convention, it is a signatory of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which integrates the key provisions of the Convention. Through this Protocol, the U.S. has incorporated the refugee definition into its domestic legal system, particularly through the Refugee Act of 1980.[304] Refugees, having fled their country of nationality to seek protection in another country, procedurally apply for a status called asylum.[305] Asylum connotes being accorded recognition as a refugee in a host country.[306] Asylum includes receiving legal protection from the crises that made refugees leave their country of nationality, however the asylum process can take on average 1,283 days until a status determination.[307] The protection granted to refugees in their receiving or host state can consist of civil, political, socioeconomic, religion, or a combination of these.[308] The purpose of these protections is to ensure that asylum seekers are protected from persecution and can enjoy a minimum core of dignity that human beings deserve.[309] Typically, the burden is on an asylum seeker, a person in the process of becoming a refugee, to persuade the officials of the receiving country of a real, imminent, and well-founded fear of persecution in their home country.[310] To determine whether there is a “well-founded fear of prosecution,” official conduct “credible” and “reasonable” fear interviews where “if [refugees] . . . express a fear of returning to their home country or request to seek asylum, they will be first screened before being removed to see if they can establish that they have a fear of persecution or torture.”[311] Adding the difference between stateless and refuges to the asylum process will bring much needed nuance because although the conditions of the statuses are similar, they differ in areas such as the legal implications of their statuses, applicable laws, border crossing requirements, proof of nationality, the nature of documentation required, and the level of expulsion the two groups may face.

A. Different Statuses

Not all refugees are stateless, nor do all stateless individuals qualify as refugees. The crucial difference between the two lies in the concepts of nationality and citizenship.[312] Refugees are individuals who have fled their country due to a well-founded fear of persecution, while stateless individuals are those not recognized as nationals by any state according to its laws. Consequently, the legal status and protection frameworks governing refugees and stateless individuals are distinct, reflecting different underlying causes and legal remedies.[313] Further, while a stateless person is someone who is not a citizen or national of any country, a refugee is a citizen or national of a country who had to leave their country of nationality to seek protection in another country because of a well-founded fear of political persecution or any of the displacement drivers already discussed in this work. Lacking the nationality of any of the 195 countries means that stateless persons cannot enjoy the rights that flow from being nationals, thereby leaving them in a vulnerable and marginalized position. Conversely, a refugee who can establish their nationality may be able to present identification documents to the host or receiving country as proof of nationality, which is necessary to access fundamental rights that stateless persons often lack.

B. Crossing International Borders

Another difference is that a person need not have crossed an internationally drawn line into another country to become stateless. As discussed earlier, a person can become stateless in their country of residence due to defects in nationality laws, state secession, or loss of legal identification documents. On the other hand, a person must have crossed an international border to seek protection in another country as an asylee to be classified under “refugee status.” However, an exception to the notion of refugee crossing is that, although a stateless person need not cross into another country to become stateless, when stateless persons eventually cross into another country, they may become protracted refugees because it may become difficult to prove nationality in the new receiving country. While the inability to provide proof of nationality does not render a person stateless, the lack of identification documents can prevent a person from legally establishing their nationality bond with a country, thereby leaving them at risk of statelessness. A stateless person may eventually become a refugee, as statelessness can be both a cause and an effect of prolonged displacement.[314]

C. Determination Procedures for Stateless Persons and Refugees

The procedure for determining the status of stateless persons differs from that for refugees under the law. For example, the Refugee Status Determination (“RSD”).[315] The legal or administrative process used by states and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to determine the eligibility status of individuals seeking international protection who have fled their country to another due to a well-founded fear of persecution. The RSD procedure can be used for a group, individual refugees, or asylees. However, they must meet the eligibility criteria in the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol, or any applicable regional refugee instruments or national asylum legislation. The effectiveness of RSD is contingent on whether a receiving state has an operational or existing national asylum system. Here, one of the benefits of a national asylum system is that a receiving state can handle the emergency influx of asylum seekers. The international community currently advocates for a simplified prima facie approach to refugee recognition or temporary protection to avoid protracted waiting lines or congested holding facilities and prevent national systems from being overrun during emergency influx. When states lack an existing national asylum system, an alternative status approach can be implemented to expedite the recognition process for eligible asylees. Generally, states can, upon verification and registration, grant a legal status such as non-refugee status (e.g., temporary protection) or refugee status.

On the other hand, a statelessness determination procedure is used to identify stateless persons and provide them with appropriate protection. The determination procedure for stateless persons is solely an obligation imposed on states by the 1954 Refugee Convention; that is, states have a responsibility to determine how to identify and protect their stateless persons residing within their territory, but only a few states have fulfilled that obligation. Here, states have broad discretion in the design and operation of their statelessness determination procedures, as the 1954 Convention does not prescribe a specific procedure for states to follow when establishing their procedures for determining statelessness. In some instances, because stateless persons may also be refugees, states could consolidate the determination procedures for both groups. Further, while it is not required for refugees’ determination, decision-makers for stateless persons may consider oral or written proofs regarding an individual’s claim of statelessness. However, actual documentation of nationality may be required for persons seeking asylum.

D. Different Applicable Laws

The leading international law instruments for refugee law are the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. The 1967 Protocol extends the scope of the 1951 Convention beyond European refugees to cover global refugees and population displacement.[316] The 1951 Convention defines who refugees are, the legal protection they are entitled to receive from state parties, and the obligations of refugees to their host states.[317] The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a “refugee” and provides a set of rights, such as the right to employment, housing, education, and non-refoulement; however, the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons defines a “stateless person” and provides some of the same rights as well as other minimum standards of treatment under international law.[318] The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness provides safeguards for states to introduce into their nationality laws and policies when protecting stateless persons.[319] Furthermore, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness helps states determine how to avoid statelessness by acquiring or retaining nationality in various circumstances. This is an area that the Refugee Convention does not cover.

Conclusion

Statelessness is more than just a legal status—it is a daily denial of dignity.[320] Being stateless means being told: you do not belong, and you do not matter.[321] Revoking or losing birthright citizenship in the U.S. would have significant repercussions, affecting not only those directly impacted but also the overall integrity of the global human rights framework. Advocates, scholars, and experts in the realm of international law must insist—in law, policy, and principle—that every human being matters.[322] This paper formally advocates for a legal and moral framework that treats citizenship not as a privilege to be revoked but as a human right to be protected.[323] When revocation is necessary, officials should allocate more weight to the dignity of stateless persons, and the ultimate decision must not be made arbitrarily or capriciously.

Statelessness represents a significant yet frequently overlooked human rights issue today. Individuals lacking nationality often exist on the fringes of society, deprived of legal protections, education, and healthcare, as well as the rights to work, vote, and move freely. Contributing factors to statelessness—such as discriminatory laws, gaps in nationality legislation, state succession, and diminishing birthright citizenship—require coordinated and empathetic global efforts. Addressing this challenge transcends mere legal duties; it is a moral imperative. Eradicating statelessness is a collective effort, and we need not only legal reforms and international cooperation but also a profound commitment to the principle that every person deserves the right to belong. Only through this dedication can we begin dismantling the concealed barriers that prevent millions from enjoying dignity, opportunities, and recognition as part of the human family. Such a loss may result in de jure or de facto statelessness, depriving individuals of their legal identity, access to essential services, and a sense of belonging. Harsh immigration policies promote exclusion, intensify social marginalization, and challenge the fundamental notion that citizenship is a birthright rather than a privilege that can shift with political changes. Ultimately, the denial of birthright citizenship poses a challenge to the moral and legal responsibilities of states under international law, undermining universal principles of dignity, equality, and inclusion. To uphold our shared humanity, nations must protect birthright citizenship and oppose policies that unjustly separate individuals from the only home they have ever known.

  1. See Kurić and Others v. Slovenia, Application No. 26828/06, ¶¶ 32–33 (Mar. 12, 2014), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/?i=001-141899 [https://perma.cc/W8UD-YK8M] (holding that the “erasure” of over 18,000 persons from Slovenia’s civil register following the breakup of Yugoslavia—after they failed to apply for citizenship in time—amounted to a deprivation rendering many stateless and violated the rights to private life and non-discrimination). See generally Cóman Kenny, Legislated Out of Existence: Mass Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality Resulting in Statelessness as an International Crime, 20 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 1026 (2020) (arguing that arbitrary deprivation of nationality, especially when en masse and group-targeted, causes marginalization, dehumanization, oppression—in effect, constituting violence against those affected. The work suggests that such policies might even amount to international crimes under certain circumstances.).

  2. Stateless persons are essentially “invisible” in the eyes of the law and political community. See William E. Conklin, Statelessness: The Enigma of the International Community 1 (Rachel Turner et al. eds., 2014) (arguing that stateless persons exist in a legal void).

  3. See Brad K. Blitz & Maureen Lynch, Statelessness and Citizenship: A Comparative Study on the Benefits of Nationality 4–5, 32 (2009) (discussing how stateless persons are denied recognition by any state and often lack access to documentation and legal status).

  4. See Statelessness, Governance, and the Problem of Citizenship 1 (Tendayi Bloom & Lindsey N. Kingston eds., 2021) (describing statelessness as the condition of being excluded from the law and from rights conferred by legal identity).

  5. The term hostis humani generis, originating from Latin, means “enemy of all mankind.” In discussions related to law and history, it refers to individuals or groups whose actions are considered so morally repugnant that any state has both the authority and the duty to prosecute or intervene, regardless of where the crime occurred or the nationalities of those involved. See Oxford Reference, https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780197583104.001.0001/acref-9780197583104-e-875#:~:text=“Enemy of humankind.” A,being ... [https://perma.cc/EF2S-M7NK] (last visited Nov. 20, 2025) (emphasis added).

  6. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101–02 (1958) (plurality opinion) (holding that, while Congress has the power over naturalization and military discipline, it cannot impose citizenship as a form of punishment without breaching constitutional boundaries). The Court made a clear distinction between voluntarily abandoning citizenship and punishment-driven deprivation. Id. Removing someone’s citizenship due to desertion was deemed a cruel and unusual punishment, which violates the Eighth Amendment, even if authorized by Congress. Id. Such punishment exceeds reasonable limits in a civilized society and undermines individual dignity. Id. The Court reaffirmed that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.” Id. at 100. “The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Id. at 101.

  7. See generally Maria Jose Recalde-Vela, Access to Redress for Stateless Persons Under International Law: Challenges and Opportunities, 24(2) Tilburg L. Rev. 182 (2019) (examining the legal challenges faced by stateless individuals in their quest for redress, particularly when a lack of documentation hinders their efforts to obtain nationality and reparations, as reflected in rulings from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights).

  8. See id.

  9. See infra Part V (examining the 1961 Convention’s rules regarding reducing statelessness, emphasizing the circumstances under which states can revoke an individual’s nationality without making them stateless, and the legal protections that exist to avert such situations).

  10. Residency and nationality are fundamentally different concepts. An individual can reside in a country for years without being officially recognized as a citizen. These individuals are categorized under the U.N. Refugee Agency’s (UNHCR) statelessness mandate, which fits the international definition of statelessness. Many countries actively compile data that includes individuals with undetermined nationality to accurately assess the total number of stateless persons residing legally within their borders. See G.A. Res. 428 (V), ¶¶ 6(A)–(B) (Dec. 14, 1950); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. I(A)(2), opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954).

  11. See Press Release, Council of the European Union, Council Adopts Conclusions on Statelessness, U.N. Press Release 893/15 (Apr. 12, 2015), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/12/04/council-adopts-conclusions-on-statelessness/pdf/ [https://perma.cc/4E8S-86RQ].

  12. Not everyone living in the 195 countries around the world possesses travel passports or documents. This situation arises not only from bureaucratic government systems but also from the inability to legally obtain a passport due to a lack of nationality which ties these individuals to the countries where they reside. A passport is essential for international travel, and those without one face significant restrictions on their ability to leave their so-called home country. Many people worldwide still lack travel passports, especially in regions marked by high poverty, political instability, or limited access to government services. Individuals who manage to travel abroad eventually need passports and often struggle to access education, employment, and healthcare opportunities abroad.

  13. See Conklin, supra note 2, at 3; see also Anna Rascouët-Paz, Citizens of Nowhere: Statelessness and the Quest to Belong, Eur. Network on Statelessness (Nov. 21, 2024), https://www.statelessness.eu/updates/blog/citizens-nowhere-statelessness-and-quest-belong [https://perma.cc/J8YK-DUB7].

  14. See Ekaterina, To Be Stateless Is to Stand at the Edge of the Void, United Stateless, https://www.unitedstateless.org/problem [https://perma.cc/B57C-W2HP] (last visited Nov. 13, 2025) (explaining that being stateless is like living at the edge of a void because a stateless person lacks membership in any country and will be seen and treated as a foreigner by every country in the world).

  15. Id. (explaining that stateless people frequently lack identity documents like birth certificates or passports—most importantly, they have no way of getting documents without documents of legal identification, so life is like living at the edge of a void).

  16. See generally Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism 1–13 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2000) (arguing that the idea of nationalism stems from the premise and movement that holds that the nation should be congruent with the state).

  17. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7. This is the notion called Self-Determination—the legal right of people to decide their own destiny in the international order. The principle that each nation has the sovereign right to govern its internal affairs without external interference is enshrined in Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.

  18. See Statelessness Around the World, Council on Foreign Rels. (Jan. 10, 2023), https://education.cfr.org/learn/reading/statelessness-around-world [https://perma.cc/J5LW-2A98]. The global community is complicated because of anxiety and uncertainty. It is thoroughly interconnected yet intricately partitioned. Pivotally, one could argue that the centrality to this global anxiety is identity and belonging. People want to identify with and belong to a political system, territory, and culture. Statistically, about 8 billion people live in nearly 200 countries, but not every person has a nationality in one of those countries. In fact, between 4 and 10 million people worldwide lack citizenship in any country, resulting in a precarious legal and administrative limbo of statelessness.

  19. See generally Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (rev. ed. 2006) (describing the fundamental transformation of historical movements and the impact on social ideology and social movements).

  20. See Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism, 35 Ann. Rev. Socio. 21, 22 (2009) (stating that “[t]he literature on ethnicity, race, and nations and nationalism was long fragmented and compartmentalized”).

  21. See generally Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens 94 (2004) (articulating the decolonization struggles of against the British, French, Portuguese, and Dutch empires after World War I).

  22. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 278 (1st ed. 1951) (explaining that apatrides is a term borrowed from French that means “stateless or without a country”). It means persons lacking state affiliation.

  23. Id. at 267–78; see also Mira L. Siegelberg, Statelessness: A Modern History 241 (Harv. Univ. Press ed. 2020). According to Mira L. Siegelberg’s commentary on Arendt, the origin of statelessness before the Second World War was that stateless persons had the description of legal freaks without the protection of the law. See generally Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (2nd ed. 1973) (describing the Second World War and its impact on statelessness). Generally, the second edition of Arendt’s book places the problem of stateless people and refugees in the center of its analysis of totalitarianism by depicting the ruthless effects of the enormous migration crisis that uprooted people from their homes during the inter-war periods. It also portrays a massive failure of the nation states that referred to stateless persons as the “superfluous” people did not belong to any political community and were therefore outlawed. The notion of totalitarianism became implicated when most states sought to annihilate “the superfluous” people (stateless persons) as a result of the impotence of human rights protection.

  24. See Arendt, supra note 22, at 266.

  25. Siegelberg, supra note 23, at 10. For further reading, see Hannah Arendt, The Jewish Writings 264–274 (Jerome Kohn & Ron H. Feldman, eds., Schocken Books, New York 2007) (stating that “[i]n the first place, we don’t like to be called ‘refugees.’ We ourselves call each other ‘newcomers’ or immigrants.”); see also Eric Kaufmann, Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities (2019). The views shared about the nexuses between statelessness and World War I is that a number of nations expelled ethnic minorities in an effort to maintain “ethnic purity” among the inhabitants who survived the war. The expelled minorities were displaced and had no legal claim of nationality to where they once called home.

  26. See Arendt, supra note 22, at 278.

  27. Siegelberg, supra note 23, at 20.

  28. Id. at 7.

  29. Id.

  30. Id. at 1.

  31. Id. at 36–38.

  32. Arendt, supra note 25, at 110. Hannah Arendt opines that statelessness could happen when seeking “refugeehood” protection becomes protracted. She shows the dichotomy of statelessness and refugeehood as intertwined. According to her, though “[a] refugee used to be a person driven to seek refuge because of some act committed or some political opinion held. Well, it is true we have had to seek refuge; but we committed no acts and most of us never dreamt of having any radical opinion. With us the meaning of the term ‘refugee’ has changed. Now ‘refugees’ are those of us who have been so unfortunate as to arrive in a new country without means and have to be helped by Refugee Committees.” Id.

  33. See Rachel Marandett, On the Road to Nowhere: The Unique Challenges Stateless People Face in Removal Proceedings and the Untenable Legal Limbo Following Final Orders of Removal, 27 CUNY L. Rev. 37, 37–40 (2024).

  34. Id.

  35. Id.

  36. See generally UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The #IBelong Campaign: A Decade of Action to End Statelessness, 2014-2024, UNHCR: UN Refugee Agency (2024), https://www.refworld.org/reference/strategy/unhcr/2024/en/148777?_gl=1*7swylp*_rup_ga*MTQwNjYxOTEzMS4xNzY5ODAxNTUw*_rup_ga_EVDQTJ4LMY*czE3Njk5NjU0MzIkbzYkZzAkdDE3Njk5NjU0MzIkajYwJGwwJGgw [https://perma.cc/P7RH-M65K] (explaining the diverse reasons for migration in the 21st century and how the need for a global alliance might foster a workable solution to statelessness and generalized global migration).

  37. See Olawale Ogunmodimu, Internally Displaced Persons: Ordeals and Analyses of the Possible Regimes of Legal Protection Frameworks, 54 St. Mary’s L.J. 407, 432 (2023) (“IDPs are also stigmatized and viewed with suspicion and hostility by host communities. They are especially vulnerable to violence, human trafficking, and recruitment as terrorists, including child recruitment, forced conscription, and sexual assault by members of their new community.”).

  38. See Thu Hien Dao, Frédéric, Mathilde Maurel & Pierre Schaus, Global migration in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries: the unstoppable force of demography, Kiel Inst. (Jan. 13, 2021), https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7806256/pdf/10290_2020_Article_402.pdf [https://perma.cc/UN9W-PS66] (studying migration in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries).

  39. Arendt, supra note 22, at 278.

  40. Id. at 276–79.

  41. See generally Patrick M. Malin, The Refugee: A Problem for International Organization, 1 Int’l Org. 443, 443 (1947) (explaining that internationally displaced individuals face vexing political questions).

  42. Id.

  43. Id. at 444–45.

  44. Id. at 446.

  45. Id. at 444–45.

  46. See Background Note on Gender Equality, Nationality Laws and Statelessness 2019, UNHCR: UN Refugee Agency (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.refworld.org/reference/themreport/unhcr/2019/en/122444 [https://perma.cc/EE32-49VH] (explaining the connection between a stateless individual and the country they are in can manifest in two main ways: first, being stateless in their country of origin, which means the place where they used to live; or second, after leaving their homeland, they become stateless in the country where they seek nationality, particularly for those pursuing international protection far from their habitual residence).

  47. The central argument of this Article posits that statelessness is a construct of human design, and the existing institutions in nations facing this issue can address it. Political will and resources are essential to eliminate statelessness. For instance, states should track their stateless individuals, as this enables them to provide essential human rights and access to vital services such as education, healthcare, and employment, which stateless persons frequently lack due to the absence of proper identification. This often results in a cycle of marginalization and heightened vulnerability; thus, acknowledging stateless individuals is critical for safeguarding them against exploitation and ensuring their fundamental rights are protected.

  48. Protect Human Rights: Ending Statelessness, UNHCR: UN Refugee Agency, https://www.unhcr.org/what-we-do/protect-human-rights/ending-statelessness#:~:text=Unable to prove their citizenship,exclusion%2C deprivation and marginalization. [https://perma.cc/9F68-DXD7] (last visited Nov. 16, 2025).

  49. Instead of discarding statelessness as the offshoot of mass displacement after the inter-war period, I argue that studying statelessness plays a vital role in teaching the root causes and history of population displacement. For example, statelessness helps to understand how cosmopolitan migrating theories were developed when the international community created the avenue for an interstate global system but did not pay enough attention to how numerous people became forcefully displaced.

  50. See Cate Blanchett & Filippo Grandi, Without a Nationality, You Live in Fear of Abuse, Arrest, Detention and Even Expulsion from the Country You Call Home, Le Monde (Oct. 16, 2024, at 09:43 CT), https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2024/10/16/cate-blanchett-and-filippo-grandi-without-a-nationality-you-live-in-fear-of-abuse-arrest-detention-and-even-expulsion-from-the-country-you-call-home_6729533_23.html [https://perma.cc/TU6E-CR4K].

  51. See Megan Janetsky & Sonia Peréz D., Stripped of Citizenship, These Nicaraguans Live in Limbo Scattered Across the World, Associated Press (Nov. 29, 2024, at 01:07 ET), https://apnews.com/article/b391e05eacd7dc3cf3968f5fb23987f1 [https://perma.cc/S6D6-WKVR] (highlighting the challenges faced by Nicaraguan dissidents who have lost their citizenship and been forced to escape, battling issues such as lack of legal recognition and restricted access to vital services).

  52. Minority groups’ lesser-known cultures risk extinction in the face of statelessness, making minority and indigenous populations particularly at risk. The global stateless population includes diverse ethnicities, religions, languages, and socioeconomic statuses. Without formal citizenship in any nation, they often find themselves excluded from governmental systems, lacking voting rights or access to essential services like healthcare and education. In severe situations, this statelessness can expose them to violence and large-scale displacement. Examples of minority groups are minorities that encompass smaller ethnic, national, religious, linguistic, or cultural groups that face disadvantages and seek to preserve and nurture their identity. See Denial and Denigration: How Racism Feeds Statelessness, Minority Rts. Grp.: Minority Stories (Sep. 15, 2017), https://minorityrights.org/denial-and-denigration-how-racism-feeds-statelessness-2/ [https://perma.cc/LP94-936T] (explaining further thoughts on this notion of disappearing cultures due to stateliness in Minority Group Rights).

  53. See Malin, supra note 41; see also Ngala Killian Chimtom, Lack of Birth Certificates Puts Cameroon’s Indigenous People on the Brink of Statelessness, Associated Press (Sep. 22, 2024, at 12:10 ET), https://apnews.com/article/e66ac688d68f1c57cabcfd2c0ec788d8 [https://perma.cc/YDF6-GU62] (exploring the risk of statelessness confronting indigenous communities in Cameroon, particularly the Baka and Bagyieli, as a result of their missing birth certificates. This lack of documentation hinders their access to vital services like education, healthcare, and employment).

  54. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 1 ¶¶ 1–2, opened for signature Sep. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force June 6, 1960). Interestingly, the 1954 Convention prohibits any form of reservations to Article 1(1) and makes the description of a stateless person binding on all States Parties to the treaty.

  55. Id. at ¶ 1.

  56. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). Article 31(1) of the 1969 Convention mandates that states ensure the fulfillment of a treaty’s object and purpose, such as the Convention on Statelessness. Typically, a treaty’s “object and purpose” denotes the fundamental reasons and aims that led to its formation, clarifying the desired outcomes and the motivations behind the agreement among the involved parties. This concept serves as a guiding principle for interpreting the treaty’s provisions in case of disputes; it embodies the “raison d’être” of the treaty within international law.

  57. Id. at art. 18. Under international law, the 1969 Vienna Convention, which governs how treaties are made, allows states to make reservations or conditions to treaties before domestication or adoption, depending on how those treaties will be applicable locally. Generally, reservations are allowed unless a treaty does not allow them, and where they are permitted, the reservations are supposed not to contradict the “object and purpose of a treaty.” See id. at art. 19, (explaining the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969). It is common knowledge that states may make overwhelming reservations about human rights treaties because they seek to regulate states’ domestic actions. They are primarily written to prevent states from taking actions that may violate the rights of their citizens or nationals. Human rights treaties may be intrusive and disruptive to state sovereignty; such may not happen to a regular treaty that does not regulate states’ behaviors.

  58. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15 (Dec. 10, 1948) (illustrating, for example, that Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) states that “[e]veryone has the right to a nationality” and that “[n]o one can be arbitrarily deprived of their nationality”).

  59. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 54, at art. 1 ¶ 1.

  60. Elements (of a Case), Corn. L. Sch. Legal Info. Inst., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/elements_(of_a_case) [https://perma.cc/5WE7-NMEW] (last visited Nov. 26, 2025).

  61. Person, Black’s Law Dictionary 1257 (11th ed. 2019).

  62. Id.

  63. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 54, at art. 1 ¶ 1.

  64. See generally David Weissbrodt & Clay Collins, The Human Rights of Stateless Persons, 28 Hum. Rts. Q. 245 (2006), https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/412 [https://perma.cc/EN2D-BZ76] (examining international law such as Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which articulates the rights of stateless individuals).

  65. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 54, at art. 1 ¶1.

  66. There is no evidence supporting the extension of the 1954 Convention on statelessness to legal or artificial entities. The Convention specifically addresses natural persons rather than corporations, which are linked to their main places of business or incorporation.

  67. Contrary to this treaty, a group of vulnerable migrating persons is called “stateless persons.” They are without a country; they do not share any nationality status and practically belong nowhere. In stasis or movement, nationality ties can be broken and give rise to statelessness. Statistically, over ten million people do not have a place they call their “country.” See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 58; see also Who We Protect: Stateless People, UNHCR: UN Refugee Agency, https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/statelessness-around-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/XCW6-XNUW] (last visited June 6, 2024).

  68. The exclusion of individuals leading to statelessness typically occurs based on how states define their nationality laws, whether through legislation, administrative policies, or customs. These are human-made legal tools that states may employ to produce geographical exclusions that ultimately lead to statelessness.

  69. See generally Roslyn Moloney, Incompatible Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Severability and the Problem of State Consent, 5 Melb. J. Int’l. L. 155 (2004) (explaining that Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties mandates that any reservations to treaties must align with their object and purpose). This is intended to prevent questionable and excessive reservations by states concerning human rights treaties. Additionally, the text discusses options for addressing incompatible reservations and highlights the advantages of a severability regime for protecting human rights. Id.

  70. Certain individuals might become stateless if nationality laws are not thoughtfully constructed. Moreover, the laws in some countries may deliberately exclude individuals from obtaining citizenship, thereby discriminating against minority groups based on race or religion or hindering mothers from transferring their nationality to their offspring.

  71. See Background Note on Gender Equality, Nationality Laws and Statelessness 2014, UNHCR: UN Refugee Agency (2014), https://www.unhcr.org/media/background-note-gender-equality-nationality-laws-and-statelessness-2014 [https://perma.cc/J2VX-X3BH].

  72. See Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws art. 1–2, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S 89 (deliberating on resolving the problem of statelessness, the members of that deliberation reasoned that humanity’s efforts should be directed in this domain to the abolition of all cases of statelessness and double nationality). “It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality.” Id.

  73. Id.

  74. See Memorandum by the Secretary General, Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, U.N. Memorandum E/AC.32/2 (Jan. 3, 1950) (proposing that the status of refugees and stateless individuals should be established through international conventions rather than relying solely on states’ nationality laws, which can be used arbitrarily to oppress marginalized groups and deny them the benefits of nationality based on discrimination).

  75. The UNHCR aims to eliminate statelessness by 2024. While this target has not yet been achieved, it remains feasible if governments and international organizations can gather accurate data to support stateless individuals and tackle the root causes of statelessness. Consequently, improved statistics are essential for enhancing the lives of those without citizenship and ultimately eradicating statelessness.

  76. See Who We Protect: Stateless People, supra note 67.

  77. See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 54, at art. 1.

  78. See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, T.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (entered into force Dec. 23, 1936).

  79. Id.

  80. Id.

  81. See Statelessness, HIAS, https://hias.org/statelessness/ [https://perma.cc/R6EL-N9JN] (last visited Feb. 3, 2026). For instance, an individual may become stateless or lose their nationality later in life due to several reasons, including changes in national borders, discriminatory nationality laws, administrative errors, or government actions that revoke citizenship, even if they were once regarded as a citizen of a specific country. See id. This scenario can arise when a new country emerges, when an individual relocates to a different territory, or if they cannot provide proof of their nationality due to lost documentation.

  82. Id.

  83. See generally Citizenship and Statelessness: (in)equality and (non)discrimination, Inst. on Statelessness & Inclusion (2018) (explaining discrimination against stateless persons and the right to equality).

  84. Id. at 13.

  85. See Press Release, UNHCR Report Exposes the Discrimination Pervading the Life of Stateless Minorities Worldwide, UNHCR: UN Refugee Agency (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/unhcr-report-exposes-discrimination-pervading-life-stateless-minorities [https://perma.cc/59ZY-2ZDV].

  86. See Countries That Deny Women Equal Nationality Rights, Glob. Campaign for Equal Nat’y Rts., https://www.equalnationalityrights.org/countries-that-deny-women-equal-nationality-rights/ [https://perma.cc/423B-945E] (last visited Nov. 7, 2025) (highlighting that gender discrimination in nationality laws can hinder children’s ability to inherit their parents’ nationality or result in women losing their nationality due to their gender or marital status).

  87. See id.

  88. See id.

  89. See, e.g., U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ¶¶ 23, 62, 66, U.N. Doc. A/79/12 (Nov. 4, 2024); Carol A. Batchelor, Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status, 10 Int’l J. Refugee L. 156, 157–58 (1998) (explaining the notion of deprivation of nationality and the impacts of statelessness where there are no alternative laws to prevent a person from being stateless); see also Sandra Mantu, Contingent Citizenship: The Law and Practice of Citizenship Deprivation in International, European and National Perspectives 1 (Brill Nijhoff ed., 2015); see U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, UNHCR: UN Refugee Agency (June 30, 2014), https://www.refworld.org/policy/legalguidance/unhcr/2014/en/122573 [https://perma.cc/WK7A-Q985].

  90. See David A. Martin, Dual Nationality: TR’s “Self-Evident Absurdity”, UVA Law. (Oct. 27, 2004), https://www.law.virginia.edu/static/uvalawyer/html/alumni/uvalawyer/sp05/martin_lecture.htm [https://perma.cc/RU3Q-7V4F] (explaining that humanity’s efforts should be directed toward the abolition of all cases of statelessness and double nationality where practicable, especially in instances where there might be a conflict between two nationality laws).

  91. See Jorunn Brandvoll et al., Nationality and Statelessness under International Law 257 (Alice Edwards & Laura van Waas, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2014).

  92. See Edwin O. Abuya et al., Statelessness, Governance, and the Problem of Citizenship 83, 146, 201, 227, 312 (Tendayi Bloom, Katherine Tonkiss, & Phillip Cole eds., Manchester Univ. Press 2021).

  93. See HIAS, supra note 81.

  94. See Mai Kaneko-Iwase, Are Parents of Foundlings Really “Unknown”? Avoiding Statelessness Under International Nationality Law, Eur. Network on Statelessness: Blog (Dec. 10, 2021), https://www.statelessness.eu/updates/blog/are-parents-foundlings-really-unknown-avoiding-statelessness-under-international [https://perma.cc/75H3-XHW5].

  95. Id.

  96. Id.

  97. See Gerard-René de Groot, Nationality and Statelessness Under International Law 144, 167–68 (Alice Edwards & Laura van Waas eds., 2014).

  98. See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness art. 2, opened for signature Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1975).

  99. See de Groot, supra note 97.

  100. Id.

  101. Id.

  102. See Protect Human Rights: Ending Statelessness, supra note 48.

  103. See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 98, at art. 2.

  104. See Olawale Olumodimu, The Politics and Consequences of State Secession, 55 St. Mary’s L.J. 771, 777 (2024).

  105. See Mike Sanderson, Key Threats of Statelessness in the Post-Secession Sudanese and South Sudanese Nationality Regimes, 19 Tilburg L. Rev. 236, 236–37, 247 (2014).

  106. See Brandvoll et al., supra note 91, at 226, 234.

  107. See Arman Sarvarian, The Law of State Succession: Principles and Practice 265, 268, 289–90 (Oxford Univ. Press 2025); see also G.A. Res. 55/153, at art. 22 (Jan. 30, 2001).

  108. See Abigail Edwards, Ángeles Zúñiga & Erol Yayboke, The State of Statelessness in Ukraine, CSIS (Mar. 1, 2023), https://www.csis.org/analysis/state-statelessness-ukraine#:~:text=Approximately 10 million people are,to personal or political circumstances [https://perma.cc/86SZ-VM2X].

  109. Ian Brownlie, The Relations of Nationality in Public International Law, 9 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 317, 320 (1964).

  110. See D. P. O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal and International Law: Internal Relations 503 (C.J. Hamson & R.Y. Jennings, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967). For example, “[a]lthough inhabitants of territory ceded by or seceding from the Crown lose their British nationality, it does not follow that they acquire either automatically or by submission of that of the successor State.” Id.

  111. See Katherine Southwick, Ethiopia-Eritrea: Statelessness and State Succession, Forced Migration Rev., https://www.fmreview.org/southwick/ [https://perma.cc/UA35-53EP] (last visited Nov. 17, 2025).

  112. See Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, supra note 72.

  113. See Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in Relation to State Succession, opened for signature Mar. 19, 2006, C.E.T.S. No. 200 (entered into force Jan. 5, 2009).

  114. See generally Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, ¶¶15, 38, 99, 118 (July 7, 2011), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"appno":["27021/08"],"itemid":["001-105612"]} [https://perma.cc/7LBW-8R2D] (holding that the UK violated the prohibition on creating statelessness by depriving Al-Jedda of his British nationality and stressing that states cannot manipulate nationality laws for policy objectives when such deprivation results in statelessness).

  115. For example, in 2014, some European countries and Canada were contemplating amending their nationality laws to allow their governments to deprive “foreign terrorist fighters” (“FTFs”) and (suspected) terrorists of their citizenship. While it could serve a national interest to deprive FTFs and suspected terrorists of their citizenship, states should take such steps in accordance with the due process of law. See Christophe Paulussen & Laura van Waas, UK Measures Rendering Terror Suspects Stateless: A Punishment More Primitive Than Torture, ICCT (June 5, 2014), https://www.icct.nl/publication/uk-measures-rendering-terror-suspects-stateless-punishment-more-primitive-torture#:~:text=Chief Justice Warren explained that,was centuries in the development [https://perma.cc/33N6-QMKN].

  116. 356 U.S. at 101–02.

  117. Id.

  118. Id.

  119. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 54, at art. 1.

  120. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 252–53 (1980).

  121. Kim Boatman, A Man Without a Country, Literally – Ex-U.S. Citizen Has Become a Drifter Among Nations, Seattle Times (Nov. 27, 1992), https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/19921127/1526849/a-man-without-a-country-literally----ex-us-citizen-has-become-a-drifter-among-nations [https://perma.cc/T84F-F4TS]; see also Steve Chawkins, Garry Davis Dies at 91; World Citizen No. 1 and Advocate for Peace, L.A. Times (Aug. 1, 2013, at 06:00 PT) https://www.latimes.com/local/obituaries/la-me-garry-davis-20130801-story.html [https://perma.cc/7CGX-WTJ4].

  122. Boatman, supra note 121.

  123. See, e.g., Austria – Constitutional Court, Case No. 5154/10, STATELESSNESS: Case L. Database (Sep. 29, 2011), https://caselaw.statelessness.eu/caselaw/austria-constitutional-court-case-no-g15410 [https://perma.cc/426N-3GJM].

  124. Id.

  125. Id.

  126. Id.

  127. Id.

  128. See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that “enemy combatants” are entitled to due process and a meaningful opportunity to contest factual findings and present evidence before a neutral decisionmaker). See Abigail d. Lauer, The Easy Way Out: The Yaser Hamdi Release Agreement and the United States’ Treatment of the Citizen Enemy Combatant Dilemma, 91 Corn. L. Rev. 927, 928 n.3 (2006) (“Hamdi agrees to appear before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States . . . to renounce any claim that he may have to United States nationality pursuant to Section 349(a)(5) [of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)].”).

  129. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510–11.

  130. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5).

  131. See Lauer, supra note 128, at 932–33.

  132. Id. at 928.

  133. See Saudi Arabian Citizenship System art. 11 (1954). Hamdi’s Release Agreement also raised concern with Saudi Arabian government officials because “since the Saudi Arabian government was not a party to the Release Agreement, it cannot enforce the Agreement’s provisions.” Abigail d. Lauer, The Easy Way Out: The Yaser Hamdi Release Agreement and the United States’ Treatment of the Citizen Enemy Combatant Dilemma, 91 Corn. L. Rev. 927, 948–49 (2006). The results of the Release Agreement revisions in the case of Hamdi was not made public by either the U.S. State Department or the Saudi government. See id. at 950.

  134. Vance, 444 U.S. at 260 (holding that the U.S. government has the onus to prove intent to surrender U.S. citizenship and not just the voluntary commission of an expatriating act, and that the appropriate standard of proof for analyzing the citizen’s conduct would be by a preponderance of the evidence).

  135. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101 (holding that the U.S. government may not revoke the status of citizenship as a punishment for crime because the interpretation of the Eight Amendment requires some “evolving standards of decency”).

  136. See Tara Watson & Jonathon Zars, 100 Days of Immigration Under the Second Trump Administration, BROOKINGS (Apr. 29, 2025), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/100-days-of-immigration-under-the-second-trump-administration/ [https://perma.cc/8DD3-2YGV].

  137. Exec. Order No. 14,160, 90 Fed. Reg. 8449 (Jan. 20, 2025).

  138. Id.

  139. Id.

  140. Id.

  141. Id.

  142. Id.

  143. Id.

  144. Id.

  145. See Haley Durudogan & Devon Ombres, What to Know About the Supreme Court Case on Birthright Citizenship and Nationwide Injunctions, Ctr. Am. Progress (May 12, 2025), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/what-to-know-about-the-supreme-court-case-on-birthright-citizenship-and-nationwide-injunctions/ [https://perma.cc/6SFX-F7KV] (reporting that federal district court judges in Maryland, Massachusetts, and Washington issued nationwide injunctions halting the federal government from enforcing the Trump Administration’s January 20, 2025 executive order); see also CASA, Inc. v. Trump, 763 F. Supp. 3d 723 (D. Md. 2025); State v. Trump, 765 F. Supp. 3d 1142 (W.D. Wash. 2025); Doe v. Trump, 766 F. Supp. 3d 266 (D. Mass. 2025).

  146. See generally 606 U.S. 831, 837 (2025) (granting a partial stay of injunctions entered against President Trump’s executive order).

  147. Id.

  148. Brief for Appellants at 1, 4, 13, 17, 19, 27, 29, CASA, Inc. v. Trump, No. 25-1153 (4th Cir. Mar. 2025) [hereinafter CASA Appellants’ Brief].

  149. 112 U.S. 94, 95–96 (1884); CASA Appellants’ Brief, supra note 148, at 38. In Elk v. Wilkins, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether someone born as a Native American in the United States could claim citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. John Elk, a member of the Ho-Chunk Nation, had severed his ties with his tribe and was residing among non-Native Americans in Omaha, Nebraska. After being refused voter registration, he sued the registrar, Charles Wilkins, insisting he was a U.S. citizen. The Court ruled 7-2, determining that Elk was not a citizen because he was not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States at the time of his birth, owing his allegiance to his tribe. This decision effectively excluded Native Americans from automatic citizenship, a situation later addressed by the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924.

  150. Elk, 112 U.S. at 102–03.

  151. Id. at 102–03.

  152. Id.

  153. CASA Appellants’ Brief, supra note 148 at 1, 4, 13, 16, 38; see also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 653 (1898).

  154. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 653.

  155. Id. at 705.

  156. See Birthright Citizenship Act of 2023, H.R. 6612, 118th Cong. (2023) (proposing to amend Section 301 of the Immigration and Nationality Act to limit automatic citizenship to children born in the United States to U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, or active members of the U.S. Armed Forces).

  157. Id.

  158. Birthright Citizenship Act of 2025, H.R. 569, 119th Cong. (2025).

  159. See Build the Wall and Deport Them All Act, H.R. 7594, 118th Cong. (2023-2024).

  160. Id.

  161. See Jenna Ellis, The Debate over Birthright Citizenship: Two Sides of a Constitutional Dilemma, Am. Fam. News (Jan. 24, 2025), https://afn.net/opinions/jenna-ellis/2025/01/24/the-debate-over-birthright-citizenship-two-sides-of-a-constitutional-dilemma/ [https://perma.cc/KD4W-2VV2].

  162. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

  163. See CASA Appellants’ Brief, supra note 148, at 1.

  164. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 693–94 (explaining the reasoning and the history behind citizenship). This pivotal case established that a child born in the U.S. to non-citizen parents (who are legally residents and not foreign diplomats) is considered a U.S. citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment.

  165. Id. at 694.

  166. Id.

  167. 112 U.S. at 102–03.

  168. What Does Tribal Sovereignty Mean to American Indians and Alaska Natives?, U.S. Dep’t Interior: Indian Affairs (Aug. 19, 2017, at 14:52 ET), https://www.bia.gov/faqs/what-does-tribal-sovereignty-mean-american-indians-and-alaska-natives [https://perma.cc/33L6-786L].

  169. See Amy Swearer, Defining Citizens: Congress, Citizenship, and the Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, Heritage Found. (Feb. 17, 2011), https://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/report/defining-citizens-congress-citizenship-and-the-meaning-the-fourteenth [https://perma.cc/9HCK-DU76] (explaining that although Congress has the power to legislate on citizenship issues, the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment sets constitutional boundaries that restrict its capacity to change birthright citizenship).

  170. See id.

  171. See Blanchett & Grandi, supra note 50.

  172. See Tom Jawetz & Sanam Malik, Turning Our Backs on the 14th Amendment, Ctr. Am. Progress (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/turning-our-backs-on-the-14th-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/VM2Q-375N].

  173. Id.

  174. Id.

  175. See Silvia Foster-Frau, David Nakamura & Molly Hennessy-Fiske, What Ending Birthright Citizenship Could Look Like in the U.S., Wash. Post (Jan. 26, 2025), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/01/26/trump-birthright-citizenship-undocumented-children/ [https://perma.cc/5UN2-M7DW].

  176. Id.

  177. See generally Kristina M. Campbell, The Road to S.B. 1070: How Arizona Became Ground Zero for the Immigrants’ Rights Movement and the Continuing Struggle for Latino Civil Rights in America, 14 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 1, 1 n.4 (2011) (explaining the positions of proponents and critics on how strict immigration policies can impact generations).

  178. Exec. Order No. 14,160.

  179. Id.

  180. Cf. Debunking the Myth of Immigrants and Crime, Am. Immigr. Council (Oct. 2024), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/debunking_the_myth_of_immigrants_and_crime.pdf [https://perma.cc/55X9-BCYV].

  181. See generally Minority Staff Report, Birth Tourism in the United States, U.S. Senate: Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, at ii (Dec. 20, 2022), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/2022.12.20- Final_Birth Tourism Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9VT-X4LZ] (Dec. 20, 2022) (“Birth tourism refers to expecting mothers traveling to the United States to obtain U.S. citizenship for their children. These tourists often cite the superior educational and professional opportunities available in the United States as their justification for making such a trip. Obtaining U.S. citizenship for their children is a hedged bet—a rainy day fund for a better life.”).

  182. See Jaclyn Diaz & Juliana Kim, DOJ Announces Plans to Prioritize Cases to Revoke Citizenship, NPR (June 30, 2025, at 05:00 ET), https://www.npr.org/2025/06/30/nx-s1-5445398/denaturalization-trump-immigration-enforcement [https://perma.cc/J7GD-2Z2D].

  183. See 169 U.S. at 693–94.

  184. See Background Note on Gender Equality, Nationality Laws and Statelessness 2018, UNHCR: UN Refugee Agency (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.refworld.org/reference/themreport/unhcr/2018/en/120612 [https://perma.cc/M88J-KZ7C].

  185. See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 54 (allowing for descent and birth as the basis for citizenship and some guidelines for naturalization).

  186. See id.

  187. See, e.g., The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (The McCarran-Walter Act), U.S. State Dep’t: Off. Historian, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/immigration-act [https://perma.cc/7Y2B-9YDF] (last visited Nov. 18, 2025).

  188. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). The Act upheld the national origins quota system established by the Immigration Act of 1924, reinforcing this controversial system of immigrant selection. Codified under Title 8 of the United States Code, the Act governs immigration to and citizenship in the United States. Amongst many improvements, it paved way for the reform of discriminatory provisions in the U.S. immigration law. For example, it created a quota system for all nations and ended racial restrictions on citizenship.

  189. Id.

  190. Id.

  191. See Chandra Kukaths, Are Refugees Special? The Ethics of Movement and Membership 255 (Sarah Fine & Lea Ypi eds., 2016).

  192. Id.

  193. Id.

  194. See generally Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 54 (allowing for descent and birth as the basis for citizenship and some guidelines for naturalization).

  195. Id.

  196. 33 U.S. 678, 702 (2001).

  197. Id. at 701. Additionally, the Court clarified that the plenary power doctrine does not permit the indefinite detention of immigrants facing deportation when no other country will take them in. To extend an immigrant’s detention beyond six months, the government must demonstrate that removal is likely in the near future or that special circumstances exist. In this instance, the Supreme Court acknowledged the increased burden and risk of statelessness faced by resident aliens in the U.S. who are deported but cannot be accepted by any country according to their nationality laws. The consequence of not being accepted after deportation is statelessness.

  198. See Blanchett & Grandi, supra note 50.

  199. Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, supra note 89, at ¶¶ 3–5.

  200. Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2022, UNHCR: UN Refugee Agency, at 43–45 (2023), https://www.unhcr.org/global-trends-report-2022 [https://perma.cc/TBD5-52RP].

  201. See, e.g., Laura Van Waas, Nationality Matters: Statelessness Under International Law 9–10 (Sch. of Hum. Rts. Rsch. Series 2008) (stating that to register a stateless person as a person of “unknown nationality” or simply as a “non-citizen” is to further obscure the statistics and add to the invisibility of this group.) (footnotes omitted).

  202. See UNHCR: U.N. Refugee Agency, supra note 48.

  203. See id. at 4 (UNHCR notes that statelessness affects millions worldwide, threatening human dignity, social stability, and the international rule of law).

  204. See id.

  205. Jeffrey L. Blackman, State Successions and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an Effective Nationality Under International Law, 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1141, 1144 (1998); see also Zoya Golovneva, Joint Steps to End Statelessness in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Eur. Network on Statelessness (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.statelessness.eu/updates/blog/joint-steps-end-statelessness-commonwealth-independent-states [https://perma.cc/3BWV-9K6T].

  206. See UNHCR: U.N. Refugee Agency, supra note 48.

  207. See Rascouët-Paz, supra note 13.

  208. See Adeno Addis, Human Dignity in Comparative Constitutional Context: In Search of an Overlapping Consensus, 2 Tulane J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1, 1–2 (2015).

  209. Id.

  210. See Nigeria Const. § 33(2) (1999); Kenya Const. art. 28 (stating that a person is entitled “to be treated with dignity and respect and to be addressed and referred in a manner that is not demeaning”); El Sal. Const. art. 11 (2003); Bol. Const. art. 73 (2009); Croat. Const. art. 25 (2001); Ukr. Const. art. 28 (2004). All these national constitutions use dignity as a right that impedes the government from arbitrarily violating people’s bodily and human integrity.

  211. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (“By protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons.”).

  212. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.

  213. See George Kateb, Human Dignity (Harv. Univ. Press 2011) (defending the idea of human dignity an existential value or worth).

  214. See Addis, supra note 208, at 2–5.

  215. See Hanna Arendt, Vies Politiques 1 (Paris: Tel/Gallimard, 1986); Hanna Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil 268–69 (1965) (emphasis added).

  216. See UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014, reliefweb (June 18, 2015), https://reliefweb.int/report/world/unhcr-global-trends-forced-displacement-2014 [https://perma.cc/AZY5-SS9Q].

  217. Statelessness and Displacement: A Humanitarian Challenge, Norwegian Refugee Council & Tilburg Univ., https://files.institutesi.org/stateless_displacement_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8MV-4HFS] (last visited October 16, 2023).

  218. See Mohammad Sajedur Rahman & Nurul Huda Sakib, Statelessness, Forced Migration and the Security Dilemma Along Borders: An Investigation of the Foreign Policy Stance of Bangladesh on the Rohingya Influx, 1 SN Soc. Sci. 160, 160 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1007/s43545-021-00173-y [https://perma.cc/7YWQ-7JDB].

  219. Briefing, Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law and Rohingya, Burmese Rohingya Org. U.K. (Dec. 2014), https://burmacampaign.org.uk/media/Myanmar’s-1982-Citizenship-Law-and-Rohingya.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZDJ-VC66].

  220. See The World’s Stateless 2020: Deprivation of Nationality, Inst. on Statelessness & Inclusion, at 14–18 (Mar. 2020), https://files.institutesi.org/WORLD’s_STATELESS_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7GK-E34E] (emphasizing that human rights abuses drive stateless persons to flee, often risking their lives in irregular migration).

  221. Statelessness and Displacement: A Humanitarian Challenge, supra note 217.

  222. See de Groot, supra note 97, at 144; see also Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sep. 2, 1990).

  223. See generally The Link Between Refugees and Statelessness, Norwegian Refugee Council & Inst. on Statelessness & Inclusion, https://www.syrianationality.org/index.php?id=16 [https://perma.cc/2LAY-D4QB] (last visited Nov. 7, 2025) (explaining that under the nationality law of Liberia, a child may only inherit nationality from his or her mother if born inside the country. For a child born outside of Liberia, the only way to acquire Liberian nationality is through the father.).

  224. Background Note on Gender Equality, Nationality Laws and Statelessness 2014, UNHCR: UN Refugee Agency, https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/4f5886306.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QDT-L2LG] (last visited Feb. 3, 2026) (Countries such as “Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates do not allow women nationals married to foreign nationals to pass their nationality to their children. However, they do permit women nationals to confer their nationality to their children in certain circumstances such as where fathers are unknown, stateless, of unknown nationality or do not establish filiation.”).

  225. See Cornelia Wunsch, Women’s Property and the Law of Inheritance in the Neo-Babylonian Period, Ctr. for Hellenic Stud. (May 2021) https://classics-at.chs.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ca1.2-wunsch.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RMF-ELV2].

  226. See Background Note on Gender Equality, Nationality Laws and Statelessness 2018, supra note 184.

  227. Id.

  228. Id.

  229. Id.

  230. Id.

  231. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 98, at art. 4(1).

  232. Id.

  233. Id.

  234. Id. at art. 1(3) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1(b) and 2 of this article, a child born in wedlock in the territory of a Contracting State, whose mother has the nationality of that State, shall acquire at birth that nationality if it otherwise would be stateless.”).

  235. Jus sanguinis, Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jus sanguinis [https://perma.cc/66CX-FRTJ] (last visited Nov. 7, 2025); Jus soli, Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jus soli [https://perma.cc/XAH9-FTEY] (last visited Nov. 7, 2025).

  236. Gerard-René de Groot & Olivier Vonk, Acquisition of Nationality by Birth on a Particular Territory or Establishment of Parentage: Global Trends Regarding Jus Sanguinis and Jus Soli, 65 Neth. Int’l L. Rev. 319, 321 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-018-0118-5 [https://perma.cc/S5LC-UVEB].

  237. See Interview with Gerard-René de Groot - Profesor of Comparative Law and Private International Law at Maastricht University, Eur. Network on Statelessness (Sep. 22, 2016), https://www.statelessness.eu/updates/news/interview-gerard-rene-de-groot-profesor-comparative-law-and-private-international-law [https://perma.cc/2Y6B-ZKFR] (explaining the international standards regarding the acquisition and loss of nationality and how to encourage States to implement those standards in their own nationality law).

  238. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 98, at art. 1(3).

  239. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 58, at art. 15.

  240. See id. at art. 1.

  241. Id. at art. 15(2).

  242. Id.

  243. See id. at art. 15(1).

  244. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 212, at art. 24(3).

  245. See id.

  246. See id.

  247. See id. at arts. 7–9, 11–19, 21–22.

  248. See id. arts. 2, 5(2), 6-9, 11–12, 14–19, 21–22.

  249. See id. at arts. 24(2)–(3).

  250. Id. at art. 24(2).

  251. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 17: Art. 24 (Rights of the Child), ¶ 4 (Apr. 7, 1989) (mentioning Arts. 2 and 26 of the ICCPR).

  252. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 212, at art. 24(2).

  253. Id. at arts. 2(2), 24, 26.

  254. Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child: From Guidance to Governance, 12 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1, 15–16 (2012).

  255. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artII-S2-C2-1-4/ALDE_00012955/ [https://perma.cc/9B76-8ZNQ]. Some indicators of intent can be made through analyzing the treaty’s indeterminate language. Id. Further, one can also analyzed whether the treaty deals with a matter within the exclusive lawmaking power of Congress, meaning that Congress must create implementing legislation. Id.

  256. See Families Rising, Key Child Welfare Laws, https://wearefamiliesrising.org/key-us-child-welfare-laws/ [https://perma.cc/YAF5-CTQB] (lasted visited Feb. 23, 2026).

  257. See id. at art. 24.

  258. See id.

  259. Id.

  260. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 212, at art. 24 (Article 24 recognizes the child’s right to a name and nationality but does not impose jus soli nationality requirements).

  261. Id.

  262. See African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child arts. 2, 11(6), Nov. 29, 1999, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (noting that a “child” means every human being below the age of 18 years). It stipulates that States Parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that children who become pregnant before completing their education shall have an opportunity to continue with their education on the basis of their individual ability. Id.

  263. Id. at art. 6(4).

  264. See id. at art. 6.

  265. See Herma H. Kay et al., Family Law: Cases, Text, Problems 412 (6th ed. 2021) (The treatise states that adoption occurs when a person or persons legally assume parental rights and duties for a child previously under the care of their biological or legal parents.).

  266. See id.

  267. See Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1299 (establishing international rules governing adoption authorities, cooperation between states, and safeguards for children involved in intercountry adoption).

  268. Id.

  269. Frederic L. Kirgis, International Agreements and U.S. Law, Am. Soc’y Int’l L. (May 27, 1997), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/2/issue/5/international-agreements-and-us-law [https://perma.cc/37PT-VECD]; see also Ryan Hanlon, Reflection: Ten Years After the U.S. Joins the Hague Convention, NCFA: Nat’l Council for Adoption, No. 118 (Apr. 1, 2018), https://adoptioncouncil.org/publications/2018/04/adoption-advocate-no-118 [https://perma.cc/JXV8-5W64].

  270. Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption arts. 16, May 29, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1299.

  271. Id.

  272. See, e.g., Ethnic Cleansing, Int’l Comm. Red Cross: How Does Law Protect in War?, https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/ethnic-cleansing [https://perma.cc/KTD7-U76W] (last visited Nov. 7, 2025).

  273. See Ethnic Cleansing, Medecins Sans Frontieres: Practical Guide to Humanitarian L., https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/ethnic-cleansing/ [https://perma.cc/6YF7-9EZ9] (last visited Nov. 7, 2025); see also U.N. Secretary General, Letter dated Feb. 10, 1993, from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25274 [hereinafter U.N. Sec. Gen. Letter Feb. 10].

  274. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted July 17, 1998, United Nations, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/rome-statute-international-criminal-court [https://perma.cc/K49V-3P2Y].

  275. See Medecins Sans Frontieres: Practical Guide to Humanitarian L., supra note 273; see also U.N. Sec. Gen. Letter Feb. 10, supra note 272 (A United Nations commission of experts mandated to look into violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia defined ethnic cleansing in its interim report S/25274 as rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area. It says it also means a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.).

  276. See Kimani Njogu & Gregory Stanton, Preventing Ethnic Genocide: Policy Guidance Note, U.N. Off. on Genocide Prevention & Resp. to Protect, at 17 (2024), https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/preventing_ethnic_genocide_nov2024.pdf [https://perma.cc/RUV5-DJCR].

  277. Ethnic Cleansing, supra note 273.

  278. See, e.g., Mowsume Bhattacharjee, Statelessness of an Ethnic Minority: The Case of Rohingya, 6 Frontiers Pol. Sci. 1144493 (2024).

  279. See id. at 7.

  280. See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 54; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 10.

  281. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 54, at art. 1 (Article 1 provides the authoritative legal definition of a de jure stateless person.).

  282. Id. at art. 1(1); UNHCR: U.N. Refugee Agency, Guidelines on Statelessness No. 5: Loss and Deprivation of Nationality Under Articles 5–9 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. HCR/GS/20/05 (May 2020).

  283. As of January 2014, a report by UNHCR indicated there were eighty States Parties. See Protecting the Rights of Stateless Persons: The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, UNHCR: U.N. Refugee Agency, at 1 (Jan. 2014), https://www.acnur.org/us/sites/en-us/files/legacy-pdf/519e20989.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2ZA-WF8S].

  284. Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, supra note 89, at ¶¶ 2.2, 11.

  285. Id. ¶¶ 2.2, 11–12 (“Persons may be considered de facto stateless when they are unable to avail themselves of the protection of the State of nationality, for example due to refusal of reentry, loss of documents, or displacement, even when no criminal conduct is involved.”).

  286. United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, Final Act (1961), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1299 (1994).

  287. Mai Kaneko-Iwase, Nationality of Foundlings: Avoiding Statelessness Among Children of Unknown Parents Under International Nationality Law 46–47 (2021).

  288. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 58, at art. 15.

  289. Id.

  290. See Arbitrary, Oxford Dictionaries, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/arbitrary_adj?tl=true [https://perma.cc/39B3-EHFN] (last visited Nov. 7, 2025).

  291. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 58, at art. 15.

  292. See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 18(1)(a), Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008) (prohibits states from depriving disabled persons of their nationality arbitrarily or because of their disability).

  293. See American Convention on Human Rights art. 20(3), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978).

  294. See Jorunn Brandvoll, Deprivation of Nationality: Limitations on Rendering Persons Stateless Under International Law, in Nationality and Statelessness under International Law 194, 195 n.8 (Alice Edwards & Laura van Waas eds., 2014).

  295. See Serena Forlati, The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and International Human Rights Law, UNODC: U.N. Off. on Drugs & Crime, at 30 (Apr. 2022), https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/tools_and_publications/21-01901_UNTOC_Human_Rights_eBook.pdf [https://perma.cc/LNR2-GZB9].

  296. Id. at 195, 197 n.19.

  297. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Executive Committee, Conclusion on Identification, Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness and Protection of Stateless Persons No. 106 (LVII)-2006 (Oct. 6, 2006), https://www.unhcr.org/us/publications/conclusion-identification-prevention-and-reduction-statelessness-and-protection [https://perma.cc/3WJS-LB7X].

  298. See Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019, UNHCR: UN Refugee Agency (2020), https://www.unhcr.org/flagship-reports/globaltrends/globaltrends2019/#:~:text=During 2019%2C an estimated 11.0,the borders of their countries.&text=Many displaced populations failed to,solutions for rebuilding their lives [https://perma.cc/9267-9G95].

  299. See Kaneko-Iwase, supra note 287, at 51.

  300. Id. at 51, 57.

  301. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees Exec. Comm., Conclusion on the Provision of International Protection Including Through Complementary Forms of Protection No. 103 (LVI)-2005, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/1021 (2005), http://www.unhcr.org/43576e292.html [https://perma.cc/KAB7-6VWZ] (reaffirming that the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees together with its 1967 Protocol are the cornerstone of the international refugee protection regime; and noting in this regard the fundamental importance of their full application by State Parties, including that of the fundamental principle of non-refoulement and the principle that all human beings (stateless and refugees or other displaced migrants) shall enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination, including the right to seek and enjoy asylum). Further, the European Union’s subsidiary protection regime evidenced in the Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 provides for some continental minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted. See Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third-Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (EC).

  302. See generally U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, Submitted Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1997/39: Addendum: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, arts. 1, 3, 8, 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998) (noting that the United States has yet to sign and domesticate the Convention, but it signed its 1967 Protocol, which incorporates or replicates the Refugee Convention). The Refugee Convention places an obligation on state parties to ensure the protection of refugees or asylum seeks living within their borders. Id. It also obligates states to treat these persons with at least the minimum core of human dignity and that states must not send these persons back to other countries or their country of nationality (refoulement) if such a would lead to their persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Id.

  303. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 10, at art.1(2) (The Convention is the key legal document that forms the basis of refugee protection. Ratified by 145 State parties, it defines the term “refugee” and outlines the rights of the displaced, as well as the legal obligations of States to protect them.).

  304. The United States Code states as follows:

    The term “refugee” means (A) any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or (B) in such special circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation (as defined in section 1157(e) of this title) may specify, any person who is within the country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within the country in which such person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The term “refugee” does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

    8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).

  305. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 10, at art.1 (a)–(b)(1)(b); see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(2)–(3), Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) (Asylum procedures depend on various nationality laws and states’ administrative policies. Therefore, each state makes rules that regulate how asylum applications are processed and determined. For example, there some states have existing procedures and designated officials to receive and register asylum applications and others do not have such provisions. Here, the UNHCR has filled the chasm by allowing asylum seekers to apply and lodge their applications with the High Commissioner’s office. The norm is that where States national procedures of how to examine and determine the status of asylum applications, the UNHCR does not meddle with the national protocols except where a State’s process is grossly unfair and overly restrictive. The UNHCR may also intervene or advice States who are a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention.).

  306. Fact Sheet, Asylum in the United States, Am. Immigr. Council (May 9, 2025), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/fact-sheet/asylum-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/E4MU-EMFQ].

  307. Id.

  308. Id.

  309. Id.

  310. Id.

  311. Id.

  312. See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 54, at 3, 5, arts. 1(1), 32.

  313. Id. at arts. 1, 2(ii) (Nationality means the legal bond between a government and an individual, and allows for certain political, economic, social and other rights of the individual, as well as the responsibilities of both government and citizen. This type of member results in obligation and duties such as the right to vote and pay taxes.).

  314. See UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Statelessness as a Root Cause of Forced Displacement and Forced Displacement as a Cause of Statelessness, in New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, UNGA Res. 71/1, para. 72 (2016) (noting that “statelessness can be a root cause of forced displacement and that forced displacement, in turn, can lead to statelessness”).

  315. See Refugee Status Determination (RSD), UNHCR: UN Refugee Agency: Emergency Handbook (Feb. 6, 2025), https://emergency.unhcr.org/protection/legal-framework/refugee-status-determination-rsd [https://perma.cc/AC3B-HKXU] (The RSD is generally the process to assess and decide whether an asylum-seeker is or is not a refugee.).

  316. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 10, at art.1(a)–(b)(1)(b); see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 305, at art. 1(2)–(3).

  317. See UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection, at 14, 52–35 (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/5ddfcdc47/handbook-procedures-criteria-determining-refugee-status-under-1951-convention.html [https://perma.cc/G7GX-DYT8].

  318. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 54, at 3 (“For those who qualify as stateless persons, the Convention provides important minimum standards of treatment. It requires that stateless persons have the same rights as citizens with respects to freedom of religion and education for their children.”).

  319. See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 98, at 3–4; see also Mirna Adjami & Julia Harrington, The Scope and Content of Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 27 Refugee Surv. Q. 93, 101, 104, 107 (2008).

  320. See Hélène Lambert, Comparative Perspectives on Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality and Refugee Status, 64 Int’l & Compar. L. Q. 1, 7 (2015); see also Human Rights Council Res. 1998/48, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1998/48 (Apr. 17, 1998).

  321. See Luca Bücken & René de Groot, Deprivation of Nationality Under Article 8(3) of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 25 Maastricht J. Eur. & Compar. L. 38, 39 (2018).

  322. See Hélène Lambert, Refugee Status, Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, and Statelessness Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, UNHCR: Div. Int’l Prot., Oct. 1, 2014, at 1, 2, 35.

  323. See Guidelines on Statelessness No. 5, supra note 282, at 2–3; see also David Owen, On the Right to Have Nationality Rights: Statelessness, Citizenship and Human Rights, 65 Neth. Int’l L. Rev. 299, 300–01 (2018).